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JUSTICES ORDER JONES CASE TO PROCEED
The Washington Times
Wednesday, May 28, 1997
Frank J. Murray
A unanimous Supreme Court said yesterday
President Clinton must immediately face Paula Corbin
Jones' charge he sexually harassed her in a Little Rock
hotel room and defamed her from the White House
when she complained.
The court rejected Mr. Clinton's claim that
presidents are immune - if only temporarily - from
being sued for private acts.
"Like every other citizen who properly invokes that
jurisdiction, [Mrs. Jones] has a right to an orderly
disposition of her claims," reads the opinion, in which
Justice John Paul Stevens demolished one by one every
rationale Mr. Clinton's attorneys cited to delay court
proceedings until he leaves office.
The ruling could launch a major trial soon or put
derailed settlement talks back on track.
"We have never suggested that the president, or any
other official, has an immunity that extends beyond
the scope of any action taken in an official capacity,"
the court said in a decision that tightens limits on
presidential immunity just as the Watergate tapes
decision tightened them on Richard Nixon.
The opinion denying Mr. Clinton's claim advised
U.S. District Judge Susan Webber Wright to manage
the case with "utmost deference" but gave no
standards to guide her if the president delays, leaving
open the prospect of postponements if the White
House claims official conflicts.
One option would be dismissal if the judge accepts
the Clinton contention that Mrs. Jones' claims, even
if true, don't add up to a federal civil rights violation.
All nine justices voted to affirm an 8th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals judgment and let the lawsuit go
ahead, but Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not join the
others in supporting the reasoning.
His concurring opinion said private lawsuits must be
delayed if a president gives a "reasoned explanation."
Mr. Clinton is the fourth president to face a private
suit in office but the first to face trial.
Mr. Clinton was silent on the decision in Paris,
where he was reportedly preoccupied with "the
nation's business." But he took time from the
Russia-NATO summit to talk with personal attorney
Robert S. Bennett.
"We thought we would get some sort of a mixed
ruling. I was hopeful we would get a little more out of
the decision than we got," Mr. Bennett said.
He dangled the possibility of a settlement, then
undermined that prospect when asked if Mr. Clinton
fears embarrassment.
"When all is said and done, the embarrassment will
be on the side of Paula Jones," Mr. Bennett said in a
CNN interview.
At one point he said Mr. Clinton won't pay
anything to settle, then said he won't pay a "large
sum" to dispose of Mrs. Jones' $700,000 claim. She
also demands an apology.
Her lawyers "would have to call me and recommend
language that I could recommend to the president.
The president has adamantly denied this, and I am not
going to take any action that undercuts that," Mr.
Bennett said.
Mrs. Jones, who has been living in Los Angeles for
about three years with her husband, was described by
a friend as jubilant, according to the Associated Press.
"The two of us just screamed and yelled and cried,"
said Susan Carpenter-McMillan of San Marino, Calif.
"She said, 'Susie, can you believe it? Can you believe
it?' "
Mrs. Jones' gleeful lawyers said that when court
papers clear in about a month, they will begin pretrial
discovery - taking depositions, subpoenaing
documents and seeking evidence that Mr. Clinton, as
governor of Arkansas, had a pattern of using state
troopers "for the procurement of women."
That process could include requests for medical
exams and photos of the "distinguishing
characteristics" Mrs. Jones said she saw when Mr.
Clinton exposed his groin area. The strategy is to
conduct the process in public, although Mr. Clinton's
lawyers certainly will seek to seal pretrial files.
Mrs. Jones' lead counsel, Gilbert K. Davis of
Fairfax City, predicted trial within a year. He and
associate Joseph Cammarata of Washington said they
are open to settlement but deflected money talk.
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"What Paula Jones wants is her good name and
reputation back from Bill Clinton. He's got it. She
wants it. We're going to get it for her," Mr.
Cammarata said at a news conference. He denied any
political or profit motive.
In reviewing the team's previous negotiations with
Mr. Bennett, Mr. Davis said that when wording of an
apology was close to acceptable, "they blew up those
discussions, so that's the long and the short of it."
Mr. Davis said his pursuit of the Republican
nomination for Virginia attorney general won't
interfere with his client's interests.
"I think the important feature of this case is that we
do not have kings here and that there is equal access
to justice no matter the privilege, power or position of
a public official," Mr. Davis said.
Mrs. Jones filed suit May 6, 1994, over Mr.
Clinton's behavior in a suite at the Excelsior Hotel
three years before, when both attended the Governor's
Quality Management Conference. She said she was
summoned by Trooper Danny Ferguson, who said the
governor wanted to meet with her.
Inside the suite, she said, Mr. Clinton made verbal
and physical sexual advances, including exposing
himself, and cautioned her to keep silent when she
refused and left.
In a complaint likely to be the subject of appeals if
the case is not settled, Mrs. Jones charges two counts
of civil rights violations, one of emotional distress and
one of defamation.
The Supreme Court surprised legal circles by
releasing such a sensitive opinion five weeks before
the session's end, when such important rulings are
anticipated.
The decision differentiated charges of "abhorrent"
sexual liberties from a precedent called Nixon vs.
Fitzgerald, which involved the firing of a
whistleblower. That decision declared presidents have
lifetime immunity from civil suits for official actions.
Among many points, yesterday's decision:
* Discounted Mr. Clinton's contention that the
order could lead to a flood of political lawsuits.
* Called his separation-of-powers arguments
invalid.
* Said Judge Wright will give "utmost deference" to
the president's official responsibilities, as she did in
taking his videotaped testimony at the White House
during the Whitewater trial of Jim and Susan
McDougal and Arkansas Gov. Jim Guy Tucker.
Expected among the first hurdles in the case is a
Clinton motion to dismiss for failure to state a federal
cause of action - the contention that sexual overtures
by a government official have never been held in a
noncriminal case to violate the civil rights laws except
when the target is in custody.
Judge Wright had ruled that discovery could go
ahead but put the trial on hold until Mr. Clinton left
the presidency. Seeking greater immunity, Mr.
Clinton appealed, but the 8th Circuit ordered the case
to proceed immediately. That decision was affirmed
yesterday.
"We assume that the testimony of the president, both
for discovery and for use at trial, may be taken at the
White House at a time that will accommodate his busy
schedule and that, if a trial is held, there would be no
necessity for the president to attend in person, though
he could elect to do so," the Supreme Court's opinion
reads.
"Several presidents, including petitioner, have given
testimony without jeopardizing the nation's security."
The Washington Times Copyright 1997
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BOTH SIDES SETTING TERMS OF CLINTON SUIT SETTLEMENT
Los Angeles Times
Thursday, May 29, 1997
David G. Savage; Robert L. Jackson
One day after the Supreme Court cleared the way for a
trial in the Paula Corbin Jones sexual-harassment lawsuit,
attorneys for both President Clinton and the former
Arkansas state worker were talking about the broad
outlines of a settlement.
While the two parties were not negotiating directly, in
public and private comments the lawyers set out the terms
of an agreement that could end the dispute.
Both sides said that they see advantages to settling soon
instead of moving toward a long, expensive and
embarrassing trial.
"This case has settlement written over it," said an
attorney familiar with the situation. "Both sides have left
room in their statements so far that would allow them to
find common ground."
The president's lawyer, Robert S. Bennett, despite taking
a thumping from the high court, has been the more
adamant party in setting conditions for a settlement.
Clinton will neither admit to wrongdoing nor pay money
to Jones, he said.
"The president did nothing wrong," he said in a televised
interview.
However, legal sources said Wednesday that Clinton
would be willing to issue a statement attesting to Jones'
good character and asserting that she did nothing
improper. Clinton may also be agreeable to admitting that
the two met at a Little Rock hotel, although he has no
recollection of it, the sources said.
Meanwhile, the lawyers for Jones repeatedly have
asserted their client is not seeking money, but rather
wants her good name and reputation restored.
"The essential feature of any settlement would have to be
a statement that would redeem her reputation, and that is
non-negotiable," attorney Gilbert Davis said in a TV
interview Wednesday. "The particular language is
something we could talk about but it would have to
include that."
While Davis and fellow Jones attorney Joseph
Cammarata have been talking in public about the terms of
a settlement, they said that the next step is up to Clinton's
lawyers.
"I'm not going to propose something for them,"
Cammarata said. "It's for them now to come to us with
some kind of proposal."
Money could still prove a sticking point, as it was
apparently three years ago.
A source close to Clinton's legal team said that Jones'
lawyers have been "asking for megabucks, and that is
unacceptable."
Clinton's legal team, which is being supported by
insurance payments, could afford to pay a money
settlement to Jones, but the president's advisors said that
such a payment would be seen wrongly by the public as an
admission of guilt.
However, Clinton's lawyers have not ruled out the
possibility of paying some legal fees and expenses
incurred by Jones' two lawyers, the sources said. One
suggested a payment in the range of $50,000 to $100,000.
The outlines of a settlement could be along the lines of a
proposed agreement that collapsed shortly before Jones
filed her lawsuit in 1994. In that proposal, Clinton would
have stated his regret for any untrue assertions casting
doubt on Jones' good character.
But his lawyers balked at having the president adopt a
phrase suggested by Jones' lawyers that Clinton would
"have no further comment on my own conduct or my prior
statements."
Sources said that the White House still objects to the
president making any reference to his own conduct on
grounds that such a reference could raise questions in the
minds of the public.
Davis said that a public statement made by a White
House aide in 1994 delivered a final fatal blow to the
out-of-court negotiations. The aide told reporters that
Jones was delaying the filing of her complaint because she
realized that she had a weak case and that some family
members were opposed to the lawsuit, both of which were
untrue, Davis said.
Since a settlement is far from assured, both sides are also
preparing for the next round of litigation.
Clinton's lawyers are expected to file motions in Little
Rock urging that the lawsuit be dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action. In most such cases, this step would
have been taken three years ago, soon after the lawsuit
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was filed.
In this case, however, the president's lawyers were able
to use his possible immunity as chief executive to delay
the case. That fight, although unsuccessful, took up three
years-and pushed the case out of the headlines until after
the 1996 presidential election.
Now, Clinton's lawyers can challenge the legal basis for
the lawsuit.
Jones did not file a simple sexual-harassment suit,
instead relying on a Reconstruction-era statute that
authorizes damage claims against state officials who
violate someone's constitutional rights while acting
"under color of law."
This approach complicates the case and could lead to its
dismissal, legal experts said.
The president's lawyers "have a plausible argument [for
dismissal]. It's certainly debatable," said Duke University
law professor William Van Alstyne, a constitutional
expert who joined the Supreme Court fight on Jones' side.
Typically, a person who suffers sexual harassment on the
job would sue under the federal anti-discrimination law.
Title 7 of the law makes it illegal to discriminate against
an employee based on race or sex, and the courts have
interpreted sexual harassment as a type of sex
discrimination.
However, the federal law requires victims to file
complaints within six months of the harassment.
"The filing period is short because it's much easier to get
to the truth of the charges when the events are recent,"
said University of Chicago law professor David Strauss.
"You don't want these complaints to be postponed for
several years."
But Jones has said that she decided to sue Clinton in
1994 only after she read an account in the American
Spectator, a conservative magazine, quoting an Arkansas
trooper as telling of a woman named "Paula" who was
"available to be Clinton's girlfriend."
Angry and humiliated, Jones said that she sued to set the
record straight.
However, her decision to sue came nearly three years
after she allegedly was escorted to Gov. Clinton's room in
the Excelsior Hotel, where he allegedly dropped his pants
and asked her to perform a sex act.
As a result, her attorneys were forced to claim that her
constitutional rights were violated by state officials,
namely Clinton and trooper Danny Ferguson, who she
says escorted her to the room.
Since the suit was filed in 1994, law professors around
the nation have conducted lively debates on whether the
story told by Jones, even if entirely true, would be
considered a violation of her constitutional rights.
Strauss, who filed a Supreme Court brief on Clinton's
behalf, said that he doubts the claim should be upheld.
"It's not clear to me this misconduct she alleges would
violate the Constitution. If it is, every act of sexual
harassment, even if it happens just once, would be a
constitutional violation," he said.
Van Alstyne said that he would lean toward allowing the
claim to be tried. "Some of what she alleges is sufficiently
lurid and you know what I'm referring to. If that
happened, it would make for a viable claim," he said.
But other legal experts think that the public spotlight on
the case would make it exceedingly difficult for a judge to
throw it out now.
U.S. District Judge Susan Webber Wright agreed three
years ago to shield Clinton from answering to the
complaint until he leaves office, only to be rebuked by
both the U.S. Court of Appeals in St. Louis and a
unanimous Supreme Court.
"I think she will be very gun-shy about delaying this case
any further," said University of Illinois law professor
Ronald Rotunda, who has also sided with Jones. "At this
point, she doesn't have much option other than letting the
case proceed."
Copyright, The Times Mirror Company; Los Angeles
Times 1997 All Rights Reserved
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CLINTON LEAVES JONES SUIT TO LAWYERS
The Washington Times
Thursday, May 29, 1997
Frank J. Murray and Warren P. Strobel
President Clinton insisted yesterday that Paula
Corbin Jones' sexual-misconduct suit is not
interfering with his job, but he fears that the Supreme
Court decision in the case will adversely affect future
presidents.
"As to what might happen to future presidents, I am
concerned about that," he said of the Tuesday ruling
allowing Mrs. Jones' suit against him to proceed.
"There may not be anything to be done about that.
The Supreme Court made its decision."
Commenting briefly at The Hague during a
celebration marking the 50th anniversary of the
Marshall Plan, Mr. Clinton referred questions about
a possible out-of-court settlement to Robert S.
Bennett, his attorney in the case.
"I think I'll let him comment on all this. I want to
do my job, and his job is to deal with that," Mr.
Clinton said.
Asked if the Jones matter is distracting him, he
said, "This is too big," referring to his efforts to
define a new direction for Europe and the United
States.
In Washington, Mrs. Jones' attorneys began to
realize that the Supreme Court's 9-0 ruling may have
been the easy part. Now they must prepare to make
her case in a federal courtroom.
Legal analysts said she has a tough challenge that
may require new case law, particularly on her claims
that Mr. Clinton's sexual liberties with her amounted
to a violation of recognized federal civil rights.
"I know of no federal court, certainly not the
Supreme Court, that has ever found a federal
statutory or constitutional right respecting bodily
integrity," said Eugene Gressman, constitutional law
professor at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
"A judge would have to create a new federal civil
right not to be approached in this manner. I think
that takes a bit of creativity which is anathema to the
conservative commentators," he said.
Yale law professor Akhil Reed Amar, an authority
on the presidency who was critical of the Jones
lawsuit, said he expects the case to shape up as a
workplace sexual-harassment claim that she can win.
Mrs. Jones says that in May 1991, when she was a
24-year-old Arkansas state employee working at a
trade show in Little Rock, she was lured to Gov.
Clinton's hotel room, where he asked her to perform
oral sex.
"I think her allegations are that there was an
implicit threat of employment retaliation if she
declined the invitation. If that were so, I think using
governmental power against women would probably
fall within the civil rights realm," Mr. Amar said.
"On other issues I've been critical of her position,
but I can't say a judge should throw it out of court. It
might be hard to make, but it has a certain logic to
it," Mr. Amar said.
He declined to estimate the likelihood a federal trial
judge would summarily dismiss a case against the
president after it cleared the Supreme Court on an
unrelated challenge.
"Psychologically and politically I don't want to talk
about, but whichever way she does it the other side
can appeal," Mr. Amar said.
Mrs. Jones' lead attorney, Gilbert K. Davis,
sidestepped talk of coming battles over legal motions,
saying he didn't want to speculate on Mr. Bennett's
tactics or give him any ideas.
"The president has yet to say yes or no to the
specific allegations. Was he in the hotel room?
Everybody else seems to think he was. Does he
remember Paula Jones? Everybody else seems to
think he does. Did he engage in the conduct that she
alleges? Well, there may be a difference of opinion
there, but it remains to be seen," Mr. Davis said.
"We researched our legal grounds before filing, and
I'm sure they'll raise the regular . . motions,
challenging the sufficiency of our allegations and
citing statute problems, and we'll deal with them in
good time," Mr. Davis said.
The lawsuit's four counts were not attacked earlier
because Mr. Clinton's immunity claims stopped the
clock during a three-year fight that ended Tuesday in
outright defeat on that issue. But that battle bought
him time to win re-election without answering tawdry
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accusations in court.
Now the legal team headed by Mr. Bennett will
attempt to get the game called in the first inning,
asking U.S. District Judge Susan Webber Wright in
Little Rock to dismiss the case.
She has authority to do that, and such summary
judgments are common in federal civil cases. Mrs.
Jones would immediately appeal a dismissal.
The judge, who was an admiralty law student of
Mr. Clinton's at the University of Arkansas law
school, was appointed in 1990 by President Bush.
She said she will issue a scheduling order and set a
trial date when the Supreme Court mandate officially
remands the case to her, usually a 25-day process.
The president then will have 20 days to formally
deny the lawsuit's complaints and most likely will
include a raft of motions with what is effectively a
not-guilty plea.
Mrs. Jones says Mr. Clinton deprived her of
constitutional rights by exposing himself and
propositioning her at the Excelsior Hotel; conspired
with Arkansas Trooper Danny Ferguson, who
summoned her to the hotel room; inflicted emotional
distress by sexual overtures; and defamed her by
contending she lied.
Susan Low Bloch, a Georgetown Law Center
professor, said settlement still appears the best route
for the president. She did not say how he could make
a deal while refusing to pay Mrs. Jones' $700,000
claim and unspecified legal costs or to provide an
apology for acts he denies.
"I think it would be in his interest to get this
resolved and off the front page," she said.
Mr. Bennett said he is skeptical about settlement
but agrees there are circumstances that could bring
agreement. Most likely that question wouldn't be
negotiated seriously until Judge Wright disposes of
his request to throw the case out of court, probably in
late August or September
Copyright 1997 The Washington Times
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NO BRIEF FOR CLINTON, BUT THE COURT ERRED
Monday, June 9, 1997
James J. Kilpatrick
Universal Press Syndicate
In the famous case of Paula Jones and the president, the
Supreme Court on May 27 delivered a unanimous
decision. The decision was unanimously wrong.
The immediate question before the Supreme Court was
whether Jones could proceed with her damage suit against
President Clinton. By a vote of 9-0, the court said yes, the
president must prove his case for a stay. I believe this
whole unseemly business should be put off to 2001. Much
more is at stake than Jones' immediate day in court.
For the record: Jones alleges that on the afternoon of
May 8, 1991, Clinton sent a state trooper to bring the
young woman to his hotel room in Little Rock. He was
then governor of Arkansas. She was then a minor state
employee.
She charges that the governor exposed himself and
invited her to perform oral sex. When she refused, by her
account, the future president pulled up his zipper, and
that was that. Clinton denies everything.
Three years later, Jones brought suit. She charges that
under color of his office as governor of Arkansas, Clinton
deprived her of constitutional rights protected by Section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The president
responded by claiming immunity from civil suit during
his term in office. The case went to the high court where
Paula won and Bill lost.
Speaking for the technically "unanimous" court, Justice
John Paul Stevens rejected the claim of immunity. He
thought it "highly unlikely" that the case would occupy
any substantial amount of the president's time. He was
confident that the trial court would schedule proceedings
that would accommodate the White House. In any event,
Paula Jones would be injured by prolonged delay:
Evidence might be lost, the memory of witnesses would
dim.
This is why I believe the high court was wrong. Our
Constitution rests upon two bedrock principles. One of
these is the doctrine of federalism; it does not figure in the
case at hand. The other is the principle of separation of
powers. It rests at the very heart of this litigation.
My argument is that in cases such as the Jones case, a
president cannot be placed in a servile position, praying
to a district judge to do him a favor. It insults the dignity
of the presidential office.
concurring in the judgment. (It was far more of a dissent
than a concurrence.) Constitutional principle "forbids a
federal judge in such a case to interfere with the
president's discharge of his public duties."
Breyer made this point: There are 535 members of
Congress and more than 700 federal judges, but there is
only one president. The Founding Fathers deliberately
chose to focus executive authority in one chief executive
who is constitutionally indispensable.
True enough, said Breyer, presidents in the past
voluntarily have testified in pending criminal cases and in
cases involving their official actions. There is no
precedent for compelling a president to answer court
orders in a civil case involving his personal conduct prior
to taking office.
Breyer conceded the possibility that trial judges might
manage private civil suits against a sitting president
without significantly interfering with presidential duties.
"Nonetheless, predicting the future is difficult, and I am
skeptical." A single federal judge should exercise only "a
very limited power to second-guess a president's
reasonable determination (announced in open court) of his
scheduling needs."
What next in Jones vs. Clinton? My suggestion would be
that no one hold his breath until the suit goes to trial.
Jones has offered to settle out of court in return for an
apology and a check for her legal expenses. It would be
quite an exercise in prose composition for the president to
fashion an apology for an offense he has sworn he never
committed upon a woman he never met.
A temporarily final word: From everything I have read
of the case, I believe the incident happened as Jones
describes it. The president is a boor.
I also believe that Section 1983 confers no constitutional
right to be protected against lewd behavior by a public
official.
The high court's decree of May 27 seriously damaged a
fundamental principle of our government, but it's now the
law of the case.
Let the fish fry proceed.
Justice Stephen Breyer said as much in his opinion Distributed by Universal Press Syndicate
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JONES' VICTORY MAY BE SHORT-LIVED
NOW SHE FACES THE TOUGH PART: PROVING A VIOLATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1993.
The National Law Journal
Monday, June 9, 1997
Harvey Berkman and Marcia Coyle
HER UNANIMOUS and historic triumph at the U.S.
Supreme Court may prove to be the easiest victory Paula
Jones will secure in her $700,000 lawsuit against
President Clinton.
In the wake of a 9-0 high court ruling May 27 that U.S.
sitting presidents aren't immune from civil suits based on
actions taken before assuming office, Ms. Jones'
complaint heads back to federal district court in Little
Rock, Ark. The issues the parties will tussle over there are
far more mundane-and potentially less favorable to Ms.
Jones-than was Mr. Clinton's separation-of- powers
argument that he is, during his tenure as president, above
the reach of the civil law.
Ironically, one of the president's most alluring defenses
in Little Rock may well be that as governor in May
1991-when Ms. Jones alleges he exposed himself to her in
a Little Rock hotel room-he was above the reach of civil
law.
Ms. Jones' suit, while commonly described as an
employment-based sexual- harassment matter, was not
filed under Title VII, the federal law that explicitly
prohibits sexual harassment at the workplace. That law's
six-month statute of limitations had run out by the time
Ms. Jones decided to sue in May 1994. Jones v. Clinton,
LR-C-94-290.
Instead, she filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 1983, which
covers the violation of federal civil rights by government
officials acting under color of law. That law contains a
far more generous, three-year statute of limitations. But
because defendants in 1983 actions are government
officials, they have a powerful potential defense not
generally open to Title VII defendants: qualified
immumty.
"If the defendant [in a 1983 case] could reasonably have
believed that the conduct, at the time it occurred, was
constitutional, then that defendant has qualified immunity
and escapes any liability," said Sheldon H. Nahmod, a
professor at Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago-Kent College of Law now at work on the fourth
edition of his 20-year-old treatise "Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983."
"The question is: Given the allegations in the complaint,
is what was supposedly done violative of equal protection
at the time of the acts?" Professor Nahmod said.
Back to U.S. Supreme Court?
No Supreme Court case clearly declares the type of acts
Ms. Jones alleges that Mr. Clinton committed-dropping
his pants, exposing his genitals and requesting fellatio-to
violate a government employee's civil rights, Professor
Nahmod said. The question then is whether the 8th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers Arkansas, had a
case on point, and if not, what other circuits have said on
the question.
What makes qualified immunity so alluring, Professor
Nahmod noted, is not the president's chances of winning
or losing on the issue, but how he is allowed to play the
game. "The Supreme Court has made it very clear that
the issue of qualified immunity should be addressed and
resolved at the earliest possible moment," Professor
Nahmod said.
A summary judgment motion based on qualified
immunity would precede discovery, the point at which the
politically dicey issue of Mr. Clinton's sex life would be at
issue-not to mention the mortifying possibility of a court
order allowing Ms. Jones' lawyers to photograph the
president's genitals to buttress her claim that the 1991
event left her with knowledge of "distinguishing
characteristics in Clinton's genital area."
"If he loses [a summary judgment motion] on qualified
immunity," Professor Nahmod said, he is entitled to an
interlocutory appeal." That means briefs and oral
arguments in federal appellate court, followed,
presumably, by another trip to the Supreme Court, all of
which would almost certainly delay any discovery on the
merits of the matter past the November 1998
congressional elections.
Should the case proceed to the merits, Ms. Jones faces
another set of hurdles. Besides sexual harassment, Ms.
Jones charges Mr. Clinton with retaliating against her for
refusing his advances by directing her state boss-a Clinton
subordinate-to change her job responsibilities and deny
her merit raises.
"Generally, you have to show somewhat more of an effect
on employment than that to recover damages," said Lynne
Bernabei, of Washington, D.C.'s Bernabei & Katz, a civil
rights specialist. "What you usually have is a failure to
hire o promote, or imposing some kind of discipline that's
unjustied."i
But while the president's lawyers are collecting
depositions and affidavits to negate her allegations of
retaliation, Ms. Bernabei noted, Ms. Jones' lawyers would
be collecting depositions about such of Mr. Clinton's
proclivities as governor as his alleged use of state troopers
to approach women he found attractive, a point at which,
said Ms. Bernabei, "the president has already lost
politically."
Things may never get that far, says Lawrence Lorber, of
Washington, D.C.'s Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard,
McPherson and Hand Chartered: "Lots of these charges
are filed, but.. .they tend to settle because they are no-win
cases for almost everybody. Had it not been the president,
a settlement by now would have been in order.'
Copyright 1997
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HIGH COURT LIMITS BRUTALITY LIABILITY; RULING COULD CURB CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS
The Washington Post
Tuesday, April 29, 1997
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court made it tougher for victims of police
brutality to successfully sue local governments, holding in
a sharply divided ruling that a municipality cannot be
held liable for an officer's actions even if he had a history
of assault before being hired.
The decision's impact goes beyond excessive police force
disputes and would affect cases filed over many civil
rights violations. By a 5 to 4 vote, the court said a victim
must show that a city or county consciously disregarded
the risk of hiring a person and that the injuries were a
"plainly obvious consequence" of the hiring decision.
The case involved a deputy sheriff in Oklahoma who
was hired despite his criminal record and who then, while
on duty, pulled a woman from a truck and threw her to
the ground. Her knees were so severely injured that, even
after four operations, she still needed total knee
replacements. A lower court ruled that she was entitled to
an $818,000 judgment against the Bryan County board of
commissioners, but the Supreme Court reversed that
decision.
Although a victim could still sue the individual officer,
yesterday's ruling makes it harder for a person to bring
suit under a Reconstruction-era law, known as Section
1983 for its place in the U.S. Code, against a state or
municipality for infringing on rights protected by the
Constitution or federal statute. However, the ruling covers
only hiring decisions, not claims that a government failed,
for example, to properly train or discipline officers or
other workers.
"[A] finding of culpability cannot depend on the mere
probability that any officer inadequately screened will
inflict any constitutional injury," Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote for the court. "Rather, it must depend on
a finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the
particular injury suffered by the plaintiff."
The court said Congress intended the civil rights law to
be used only when government directly deprives an
individual of federal rights. "Cases involving
constitutional injuries allegedly traceable to an
ill-considered hiring decision pose the greatest risk that a
municipality will be held liable for an injury that it did
not cause," O'Connor said. She was joined by the four
other justices who have been most concerned about
protecting states' authority and rights: Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.
Dissenting justices said the ruling unfairly raises the
threshold for when states and municipalities will be held
responsible for their own hires. Some of them asserted that
it now will be virtually impossible for a victim to show
that a hiring decision caused his or her injuries.
In his dissent, Justice David H. Souter challenged the
majority's demand that there be a direct link between a
county's hiring and the harm done as a result of it. "While
the decision to hire the violent scofflaw may not entail
harm to others as unquestionably as an order to 'go out
and rough up some suspects,' it is a long way from neutral
in the risk it creates."
The case, Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown,
involved a deputy sheriff named Stacy Bums who had a
record of driving infractions and who had pleaded guilty
to various misdemeanors, including assault and battery,
resisting arrest and public drunkenness.
But Burns happened to be the son of the sheriffs nephew
and the sheriff testified that he paid little notice to Burns's
lengthy rap sheet when he hired him.
The incident that got him in trouble occurred in 1991,
when Burns pulled over a couple in their truck. Todd
Brown and his wife, Jill, were heading north from Texas
toward their Bryan County home and decided to avoid a
police checkpoint. Burns and another Bryan County
officer saw the truck turn around and chased after it.
When the truck stopped, Burns pulled Jill Brown from the
cab and hurled her to the ground. Bums pinned her down,
handcuffed her and left her there for 30 to 60 minutes,
according to the record. Brown successfully sued the
county, saying that it was liable for Burns's actions
because his police record should have prevented his
hiring.
In the majority opinion, O'Connor noted that Oklahoma
law did not prohibit the hiring of a person who has
committed such misdemeanors and said the sheriff "did
not authorize Burns to use excessive force." She said that
Jill Brown failed to show that the county, through its
"deliberate indifference," was the "moving force" behind
her injuries. She noted that typically a challenge is
brought to a municipality based on a policy rather than a
single hiring decision and that in this case the instance of
inadequate screening did not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference.
Wallace Jefferson, the county's lawyer, praised the court
for increasing the scrutiny for lawsuits related to a singlehiring action, especially, he said, when the hiring "was
not prohibited by state or federal statute."
Copyright 1997 The Washington Post
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CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL HIRING
New York Law Journal
Tuesday, June 17, 1997
Martin A. Schwartz
THE UNITED STATES Supreme Court recently
rendered a major decision concerning municipal
liability under 42 USC s1983. In Board of County
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, the Court
established strict fault and causation standards for
cases in which the plaintiff seeks to establish
municipal liability based on deficient hiring of a
constitutional tortfeasor. In these cases the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the hired officer "was highly
likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the
plaintiff."
Brown marks the Court's first confrontation with a
s1983 municipal liability deficient-hiring claim. The
Court's 5-4 decision was written by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, and joined in by Chief Justice
William Rehniquist and Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas. Justices
David Souter and Stephen Breyer each filed separate
dissenting opinions. The Souter dissent was joined
by Justices John Paul Stevens and Breyer; the Breyer
dissent was joined by Justices Stevens and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. The dissenting Justices not only
disagreed with the majority's treatment of the
plaintiffs municipal liability claim but called for
re-examination of the Court's s1983 municipal
liability jurisprudence.
Extent of Federal Review
The municipal liability issue in Brown involved the
construction of s1983. Underlying the issue,
however, lies a sensitive issue of federalism: To
what extent should the federal courts review
municipal hiring decisions? Given the nature of the
issue, it is not surprising that the more conservative
Justices were with the majority in Brown and the
more liberal-moderate Justices in dissent.
The case arose out of a confrontation between
plaintiff Jill Brown and Deputy Sheriff Bums. After
a high-speed pursuit, Deputy Burns pointed his gun
at the Brown vehicle and ordered Ms. Brown and her
husband to raise their hands and come out of their
vehicle. "When she did not exit, [Deputy Burns]
used an 'arm bar' technique, grabbing [her] arm at
the wrists and elbow, pulling her from the vehicle,
and spinning her to the ground. [Plaintiffs] knees
were severely injured, and she later underwent
corrective surgery."
Plaintiff brought suit in federal court under s1983
seeking compensatory damages against Deputy
Burns, Bryan County Sheriff Moore and Bryan
County. The County stipulated that Sheriff Moore
"'was the policy maker for Bryan County regarding
the Sheriffs Department."'
The plaintiff asserted that the County should be held
liable for Deputy Burns's excessive force because
Sheriff Moore did not adequately screen Burns before
hiring him. Burns, the son of Moore's nephew, had
a record of driving infractions and misdemeanor
convictions for "assault and battery, resisting arrest,
and public drunkenness." Sheriff Moore obtained
Burns's driving record and a report on Burns from
the National Crime Information Center but did not
closely review either. The Sheriff authorized Burns
to make arrests but not to carry a weapon or operate
a patrol car.
Plaintiffs expert testified that Bums's record shows
a "blatant disregard for the law" that may manifest
itself "in abusing the public or using excessive
force." Defendants' own expert testified that Burns's
criminal record should have caused concern, and
doubted whether he would have hired Bums. After
the jury found that Moore was deliberately
indifferent in hiring Burns, the district Court entered
judgment against the County, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
The critical issue before the Supreme Court was
whether Sheriff Moore's deficient screening of
Burns's record justified the imposition of municipal
liability on Bryan County. The majority held that it
did not.
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Monell v. New York
City Department of Social Services, held that
although municipalities are subject to s1983 liability,
their liability may not be based upon respondeat
superior. The Court's rejection of respondeat
superior means that a municipality may not be found
liable simply because it hired a constitutional
tortfeasor. For liability to attach, it must be shown
that the deprivation of the plaintiffs federally
protected rights was attributable to the enforcement
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of a municipal policy or practice. This principle is
designed to limit municipal liability to the
municipality's own wrongs.
Monell did not resolve the type of municipal policies
or practices that give rise to s1983 liability. This has
proven to be a thorny problem, partly because the
issue finds no analogue in the common law of torts.
Because s1983 claims for monetary relief are
commonly regarded as "constitutional torts," the
Supreme Court has frequently turned to familiar
common law tort principles in order to resolve the
myriad issues that arise under s1983.
Since vicarious liability is the norm for common law
torts, the determination of what constitutes a
municipal policy cannot be determined by resort to
common law principles.
Supreme Court decisional law establishes that
municipal liability can be based upon a policy
formally promulgated by the municipality's
lawmaking body, by a persistent custom or practice
having the force of law or by a final decision
rendered by a municipal policymaker. The most
difficult questions have been what type of policies
and decisions of policy makers can justify s1983
municipal liability. Courts become especially
concerned when the asserted basis of municipal
liability gets too close to the forbidden respondeat
superior.
Vicarious Liability
Obviously, the plaintiff cannot simply say that the
municipality's hiring of the tortfeasor is municipal
policymaking, because that would be tantamount to
vicarious liability. But what if the plaintiff argues,
as in Brown, that her claim is not based simply upon
the municipality's having hired the tortfeasor, but
upon its deficient screening by a policymaker in
charge of hiring? Does this move the claim
sufficiently away from vicarious liability to justify the
imposition of municipal liability?
The plaintiff in Brown relied heavily upon two
Supreme Court precedents, Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati and City of Canton v. Harris. The Court
in Pembaur ruled that the county prosecutor's
direction to the deputy sheriff to break into Dr.
Pembar's medical clinic, which was being
investigated for Medicaid fraud, constituted county
policy because state law gave the prosecutor final
authority over law enforcement matters.
In City of Canton, the Court ruled that municipal
liability can be based on deliberately indifferent
training that proximately caused the deprivation of
the plaintiffs federally protected rights. The
causation nexus is significant. As the Court stated in
Brown:
[I]t is not enough for a s1983 plaintiff merely to
identify conduct properly attributable to the
municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate
that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality
was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged.
That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal
action was taken with the requisite degree of
culpability and ... a direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal
rights.
The Brown majority found both Pembaur and City
of Canton distinguishable. Pembaur established that
municipal liability may be based on a single decision
by a municipal policymaker. It has been unclear,
however, what type of single decisions were
encompassed within the Pembaur rule. Brown
clarified that in Pembaur and other Supreme Court
decisions in which a single decision was attributable
to the municipality, the decision either itself violated
federal law or directed or authorizated the
deprivation of federally protected rights.
In these circumstances, the municipal decision itself
establishes the requisite fault and causation.
Although the Court in Brown stopped short of
holding that a single decision can establish
municipal liability only in these circumstances, it did
state that when the municipality has not directly
inflicted constitutional injury, but in some sense
allegedly caused one of its employees to do so,
"rigorous standards of culpability and causation must
be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held
liable solely for the actions of its employees."
Reliance on 'Hiring'
The claim in Brown falls into this "more rigorous"
proof category. The plaintiff did not rely on
adoption of a formal legislative policy, a persistent
custom or practice or a policymaker's decision that
was either itself unconstitutional or directed or
authorized the deprivation of federally protected
rights. Rather, the plaintiff asserted that the Sheriffs
single decision to hire Deputy Burns set the wheels
in motion that led to the alleged deprivation of her
federally protected rights. The majority found the
requisite level of culpability and causation lacking.
Naturally, the plaintiff relied heavily on the holding
in City of Canton that deliberately indifferent
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training can give rise to municipal liability. A
municipality's training policies, like a municipality's
hiring decisions, are not facially unconstitutional, but
under some circumstances, and in some sense, can be
said to have caused the deprivation of the plaintiffs
federal rights.
The fault and causation standards established in
City of Canton, however, are rigorous and very
difficult for s1983 claimants to satisfy. The Brown
Court repeated City of Canton's admonition that
s1983 municipal liability may be based on
inadequate training only in 'limited circumstances."'
Assuming "that proof of a single instance of
inadequate screening [of a hired employee] could
ever trigger municipal liability," the s 1983 claimant
who alleges such a claim shoulders an even more
demanding burden of proof than on a training claim.
The Court in Brown saw important distinctions
between hiring and training claims.
In some circumstances, failing to adequately train
law enforcement officers about how to handle
recurring situations will predictably cause violations
of federally protected rights. The high level of
predictability could justify inferences that the specific
training deficiency reflected deliberate indifference
and directly caused the deprivation of the plaintiffs
federally protected rights. Notice how the
predictability factor can collapse both the fault
(deliberate indifference) and causation requisites.
Hiring decisions are different. In a loose sense,
every violator of federally protected rights is
attributable to the municipality's decision to hire the
constitutional wrongdoer. But imposing liability on
this basis comes dangerously close to respondeat
superior liability. The issue is whether there is a
sufficiently direct link between the deficiencies
associated with the hiring decision and the violation
of the plaintiffs federal rights. The Brown Court
explained that this link is normally too tenuous in
hiring cases:
[P]redicting the consequences of a single hiring
decision, even one based on an inadequate
assessment of a record, is far more difficult than
predicting what might flow from the failure to train
a single law enforcement officer as to a specific skill
necessary to the discharge of his duties ....
A lack of scrutiny may increase the likelihood that
an unfit officer will be hired, and the unfit officer
will, when placed in a particular position to affect
the rights of citizens, act improperly. But that is
only a generalized showing of risk. The fact that
inadequate scrutiny of an applicant's background
would make a violation of rights more likely cannot
alone give rise to an inference that a policymaker's
failure to scruntize the record of a particular
applicant produced a constitutional violation.
Particularity
Again, assuming, without deciding, "that proof of a
single instance of inadequate hiring could ever
trigger municipal liability[,]" what would a s1983
claimant have to demonstrate in order to satisfy the
rigorous deliberate indifference and causation
standards? The Brown majority stated that the
plaintiff would have to show that it was "very likely"
that "this officer" would "inflict the particular injury
suffered by the plaintiff." This burden is virtually
impossible to satisfy. As Justice Souter stated in
dissent, it reflects the majority's "deep skepticism"
that such appreciation of risk could ever be found.
Not surprisingly, the Court found that plaintiff
Brown failed to satisfy the deliberate indifference
and causation standards. Even if Sheriff Moore's
hiring of Brown was ill-advised and reflected
deliberate indifference to Bums's criminal record,
Bums's use of excessive force was not a "plainly
obvious consequence of the hiring decision."
The tough standards set forth in City of Canton
make it exceedingly difficult for s1983 plaintiffs to
prevail on inadequate training claims. The Brown
majority made clear that inadequate screening claims
will be even more difficult to prove. Although the
Court did not go so far as to hold that such a claim
can never succeed, the possible window left open is
so small that it will rarely, if ever, make sense for
s1983 plaintiffs to pursue these claims.
Justice Breyer, dissenting, called for re-examination
of the Monell policy or custom requirement. In his
view, Monell and its progeny have spun out "ever
fine distinctions" that are complex, confusing and
"difficult to apply." The Court's s1983 municipal
liability jurisprudence:
1. "distinguishes among a municipal action that
'itself violates federal law,' an action that
'intentionally deprive[s] a plaintiff of a federally
protected right,' and one that 'has caused an
employee to do so."'
2. distinguishes "between an exercise of
policymaking authority and an exercise of delegated
discretionary policy-implementing authority."
3. requires courts to "decide whether a failure to
make policy was 'deliberately indifferent' rather than
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'grossly negligent."'
4. "and they must decide ... whether it matters that
some such failure occurred in the officer-training,
rather than the officer-hiring, process."
In Justice Breyer's view, there is a serious question
whether the Monell policy-practice requirement
reflects a correct reading of congressional intent.
Further, the fact that "many states have statutes that
... in effect mimic respondeat superior by authorizing
indemnification of employees found liable in s1983
actions within the scope of their employment" robs
Monell of "much of its significance."
Given the prevalence of indemnification, is this
convoluted municipal liability jurisprudence "worth
the candle?" One point overlooked by Justice Breyer,
however, is that a powerful reason s1983 plaintiffs
pursue municipal liability claims is that unlike
municipal officers sued in a personal capacity,
municipalities may not assert either absolute or
qualified immunity.
To the dissenting Justices in Brown, deficient hiring
decisions, like inadequate training, can be the
predictable cause of the violation of federally
protected rights. To the majority, however,
premising municipal liability on inadequate
screening gets perilously close to respondeat
superior. It can thus be justified, if at all, only in the
most extraordinary circumstances.
Copyright 1997
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SUPREME COURT RULES AGAINST PLAINTIFF INJURED BY SHERIFF'S DEPUTY
Liability Week
Monday, May 5, 1997
A divided Supreme Court ruled April 28 that a woman
injured by a deputy sheriff during a traffic stop cannot sue
a county on grounds it failed to detect his propensity for
violence before he was hired.
"Congress did not intend to impose liability on a
municipality unless deliberate action attributable to the
municipality itself is the 'moving force' behind the
plaintiffs deprivation of federal rights," Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote for the 5-4 majority in Board of the
County Commissioners of Bryan County, OK v. Jill
Brown (95-1100).
Jill Brown and her husband were headed into Oklahoma
from Texas when they spotted a police roadblock, turned
around and headed off in the other direction.
After a chase in which deputies testified their speeds
reached 100 mph, the Browns were overtaken. Jill Brown
didn't get out when told to do so, and Reserve Deputy
Stacy Burns dragged her out. Her knees were injured,
requiring surgery, and she is expected to require implants.
The Browns sued under 42 U.S. Code Section 1983,
which gives citizens a right to sue officials who act
illegally while purportedly acting with the authority of the
law, or "under color of law."
They claimed Bryan County was liable because Sheriff
B.J. Moore failed to review the record of Burns before
hiring him. Moore testified at trial that although the
deputy's record showed several guilty pleas, including
assault and battery, those were only misdemeanors and
Oklahoma law only bars hiring peace officers with felony
records.
A jury found for the Browns, agreeing with plaintiffs
that the "hiring policy" and the "training policy" of Bryan
County "in the case of Stacy Burns" amounted to
"deliberate indifference to the constitutional needs" of
Brown.
The Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
verdict in favor of the Browns. The county appealed, and
prevailed in the Supreme Court.
"Sheriff Moore's hiring decision was itself legal, and
Sheriff Moore did not authorize Burns to use excessive
force," O'Connor wrote for the majority.
She said the standard of "deliberate indifference" is
stringent, "requiring proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action
. . . The fact that inadequate scrutiny of an applicant's
background would make a violation of rights more likely
cannot alone give rise to an inference that a policymaker's
failure to scrutinize the record of a particular applicant
produced a specific constitutional violation."
So, she concluded, a showing of inadequate screening
isn't enough to establish "deliberate indifference."
O'Connor was joined in the majority by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.
Justice David Souter dissented, joined by Justices John
Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer.
Souter said the jury could reasonably have found that the
string of arrests and convictions showed Burns had a
propensity for violence and a disregard for the law, and
"that his subsequent resort to excessive force was the
plainly obvious consequence of hiring him as a law
enforcement officer authorized to employ force in
performing his duties."
Deputy Burns was the son of Sheriff Moore's nephew, and
Souter made a point of that in his dissent.
"The county escapes from liability," he said, despite "a
record of inculpatory evidence showing a contempt for
constitutional obligations as blatant as the nepotism that
apparently occasioned it."
In a separate dissent joined by Stevens and Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Breyer called for a reexamination of
municipal liability under Section 1983, as set forth in the
Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Monell v. New York
City Department of Social Services.
Breyer wrote that "rather than spin ever finer distinctions
as we try to apply Monell's basic distinction between
liability that rests upon policy and liability that is
vicarious," it should "reexamine the legal soundness of that
basic distinction itself."
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ROGUE COPS FIND FRIENDS AT COURT
Los Angeles Times
Monday, June 9, 1997
Jerome H. Skolnick
Jill Brown's husband, Todd Brown, made a costly and painful
choice when he turned his truck and sped away from an
Oklahoma police checkpoint in 1991. When police caught up
with him four miles later, one deputy pointed a gun at him and
the other, Reserve Deputy Stacy Bums, sharply pulled Jill
Brown out of the car, spun her around and threw her to the
ground. Todd Brown claimed that when he heard his wife cry
out, he tried to find out what was wrong but was punched
repeatedly. As he was being beaten, Brown says he said, "This
is just like L.A., huh, boys," to which Reserve Deputy Bums
reportedly responded, "No, this is a helluva lot worse."
Jill Brown sustained severe injuries to her knees. She had four
operations, two on each knee, and doctors believe that total knee
replacements will be required. She sued the County
Commissioner of Bryant County, Okla., in a federal district
court under the 1871 Civil Rights Act. A jury awarded Jill
Brown's damages and legal expenses of about $800,000, after
finding that Burns did not have probable cause to arrest her and
used excessive force in doing so.
Burns had been hired by his uncle, Bryan County Sheriff B.J.
Moore. Moore testified that he was generally aware that Bums
had a lengthy police record, but said on cross examination that
he did not notice the assault convictions, the record of resisting
arrest, public drunkenness and using a false identification.
The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (New Orleans) upheld the
jury award after noting that Bums' background evidenced a
"deficient character," a "propensity for violence" and a
"disregard for the law," all of which should have precluded his
employment as a law enforcement officer.
But on April 28, the Supreme Court overruled the 5th Circuit
in a 5-4 decision crafted by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. The
court held that to sustain a claim under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, the plaintiff has to show that the municipality itself was
the "moving force" behind the injury.
The dissent, by Justice David H. Souter, argued that a city or
county should be held accountable for actions by a policymaker,
such as a sheriff, if the single act amounts to "deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk that a violation of federal law
will result." In plainer English, since Moore was a county
official who made hiring decisions, he qualified as a
policymaker. In this case, he made a decision reeking of
nepotism, hiring a nephew who was a time bomb. Therefore, the
county should pay for the injuries caused by the resulting
explosion.
Bryant County vs. Brown and the cases leading to it show the
malleability of legal doctrine. The 1871 Civil Rights Act under
which Jill Brown sued had lain dormant for nearly a century.
The act provided civil and criminal remedies for people whose
constitutional rights were violated by "persons acting under color
of state law." The long dormancy period was traceable to a Catch
22. If police officers broke state laws while transgressing
citizens' constitutional rights, they argued that they were acting
beyond "the color of law." In Southern states, police officers who
violated constitutional rights argued that they had done nothing
more than follow state law. It wasn't until 1961-a period that
some historians have called the second Reconstruction-that the
logjam was broken. In a Chicago case involving a black family
terrorized by the police, the court under Chief Justice Earl
Warren ruled that "color of law" applies to cops who commit
constitutional violations-regardless of whether they also violate
state law.
But it was not until 1978 that a case assigned liability to local
governments-cities and counties-for constitutional violations by
local administrators. About as removed from police practices as
one could imagine, the case involved a pregnant New York City
social worker who sued her agency for denying her constitutional
rights, after she was told that it was her department's "official
policy" to compel pregnant employees to take unpaid maternity
leaves before such leaves were required for medical reasons.
This "custom and policy," the court said, made the agency and
the city liable for the harm. The case thus established through
federal law a municipal "deep pocket" for redress of
constitutional violations.
The larger significance of the Supreme Court's Brown case
ruling is in its implications for compensating victims of police
brutality across the nation by invoking a narrow "custom and
practice" interpretation of states' and cities' responsibilities
under the 1871 act. This is a loss not only to Jill Brown, but to
future victims of brutal police officers.
Had a similar situation occurred in California or other states
that require government bodies to pay most judgments against
public employees, Jill Brown might well have been
compensated. The more liberal dissenters were trying to move
civil rights law in that direction of responsibility, holding the
county liable for damages traceable mainly to an administrator's
decision. But the Supreme Court majority upheld a more rigid
interpretation of "custom and practice" jurisprudence. The
practical result could hardly have escaped their notice-that the
decision protects local taxpayers while denying compensation to
a small segment of deserving victims of police brutality. For
some of us that seems a damned shame.
Copyright 1997 Los Angeles Times
235
96-568 ONCALE v. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES
Ruling below (CA 5, 83 F.3d 118, 70 FEP Cases 1303):
Same-sex sexual harassment is not cognizable under Title VII
of 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Questions presented: (1) Are male on male sexual harassment
claims actionable under Section 703(a) of Title VII and 42 USC
2000(e)-2(a)(1)? (2) Did Fifth Circuit err as matter of law in
holding that same-sex harassment claims are not cognizable under
Title VII?
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HOW DO YOU SPELL SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
The Washington Times
Tuesday, July 1, 1997
COMMENTARY;OP-ED
Roger Clegg
The Supreme Court has now decided to grant
review in Oncale vs. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc. This case presents the issue of "same-sex
harassment," meaning whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 bars the sexual harassment of
men by other men and women by other women.
The allegations in Oncale are straightforward and
lurid. Joseph Oncale worked on an offshore oil rig.
His lawsuit alleges that his supervisor and coworkers
physically harassed him on three specific occasions.
First, the supervisor put his exposed penis on the
back of Mr. Oncale's head while a coworker held
him down; second, another coworker held him down
while the supervisor placed his penis on Mr.
Oncale's arm; and, third, the supervisor forced a bar
of soap between Mr. Oncale's buttocks in the shower.
On these and other occasions, vulgar and demeaning
remarks were made to Mr. Oncale, including threats
of anal intercourse. Mr. Oncale further alleges that
nothing was done by the company to stop this
harassment despite his complaints. He quit shortly
after the shower incident.
It is no surprise that the court decided to take the
case. The lower courts are in wide disarray over
whether the law prohibits the workplace sexual
harassment of one person by another of the same sex.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
where the case was decided, allows no same-sex
cases. The Fourth Circuit allows them, but not
"where both the alleged harassers and the victim are
heterosexuals of the same sex." The Eighth Circuit
allows same-sex lawsuits regardless of sexual
orientation, and the Sixth Circuit allows them but has
ducked the question of whether sexual orientation is
relevant.
The Clinton administration urged the Court to
grant review. In their brief, the Justice Department
and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
argued that there is no language in Title VII to
support a requirement that harassers or victims be of
a particular sex or sexual orientation. That's true.
The trouble is that there is also nothing in the statute
to ban "sexual harassment" as some judges have
defined it. The court is likely to vote unanimously in
favor of rejecting the Fifth Circuit's categorical ban
on same-sex cases. The more interesting question is
whether the court will take this opportunity to define
sexual harassment in a way that is more faithful to
the statute.
Businesses should hope so. According to Walter
Olson's new book "The Excuse Factory," the number
of harassment claims doubled between 1989 and
1993, from 5,600 to 11,900. And the requirements of
the law are becoming murkier, not clearer, as the
number of complaints rise.
Title VII makes it illegal for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to
his . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's . .. sex."
The federal regulators and courts, including the
Supreme Court, have interpreted this to ban two
broad categories of sexual harassment. The first,
"quid pro quo" harassment, occurs when the
employer requires sexual favors from an employee as
a condition of employment. The second category,
"hostile environment" discrimination, occurs when a
workplace becomes inimical to one sex or the other.
While quid pro quo cases were recognized first and
are, in general, more offensive to most people than
hostile environment cases, they are actually more
difficult to square with the text of the statute. To the
extent that what is going on can be described as
discrimination at all, it is discrimination because of
sexual attractiveness, which is distinct from
discrimination because of sex. A person's sex may be
a necessary condition of attractiveness, but it will
rarely be sufficient, and that is what the law in this
area had previously required. And rightly so.
Suppose that I can't stand President Clinton.
Someone applies to me for a job, and I refuse to hire
him because he is the spitting image of the president.
Is this sex discrimination? Of course not, even if
only a man could remind me of President Clinton.
We might call it sex discrimination if every woman,
and no man, were required to sleep with the boss, but
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most bosses accused of sexual harassment have been
more selective than that.
The case law that has developed for hostile
environment cases is problematic, too. Companies
have been sued for the sexual advances (everything
from flirting to assault), touching, bad language and
pin-up posters by their employees when a coworker or
subordinate has thought them objectionable. But it is
very hard for employers to know what is permissible
and what is not because the regulators and courts, in
defining a hostile environment, frequently have
gotten far afield from what ought to be the basic
question in any Title VII sex discrimination case: Has
someone been treated differently and worse because
of his or her sex?
Suppose a hostile environment case is brought
against an employer by a woman because some of her
colleagues hang posters in their cubicles of scantily
clad women. How likely is it that these posters are
being hung up, or allowed by the company, because
they will drive women from the workplace? Many
women will find the practice unobjectionable; many
men will be offended. It cannot suffice that there is
a mere correlation between sex and being offended.
As a statistical matter, women are more likely than
men to find "Vote for Bob Dole" posters
objectionable. Is it sexual harassment to hang up a
picture of Bob Dole?
Activist judges and regulators have gotten far away
from what Title VII actually says. This is what
happens when bureaucrats and courts pull up the
textual anchor and drift wherever their sense of right
and wrong takes them. The Supreme Court will have
an opportunity in Oncale to remind the lower courts
and regulators and that there is no violation of the
statute's text unless someone is deliberately treated
differently because of his or her sex.
Many of the actions now challenged as sexual
harassment are reprehensible or at least
inappropriate. But they are not discrimination
because of sex and, accordingly, they should not be
held to violate any federal law. If they are to be the
subject of federal lawsuits, then Congress should pass
a law and the president should sign it. That is their
job, not the job of bureaucrats or judges.
Should we have such a law? Probably not. There
is no reason why sexual activity in the workplace
should be regulated by the federal government. Many
states already have laws banning sexual harassment,
and many companies would adopt anti-harassment
policies voluntarily. The legal regime that Congress
and the president come up with may be even worse
than what we have now. Certainly the recent military
controversies have shown that standards of sexual
conduct are as vexing an issue for the political
branches as they have been for the courts.
Copyright 1997 The Washington Times
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U.S. SUPREME COURT SEEKS ADVICE FROM JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
ON SAME-SEX HARASSMENT APPEAL
West Legal News
December 18, 1996
By Theresa Schulz
Before deciding whether to grant certiorari in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, the U.S.
Supreme Court made an interesting move: It asked
the Justice Department to submit briefs on the
subject.
When it made the request Dec. 16, the Supreme
Court gave the first indication of its interest in the
issue of whether same-sex harassment claims are
cognizable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
The issue has generated a number of conflicting
circuit decisions. Until now, the Supreme Court has
denied cert. in similar cases brought before it. Sixteen
federal district courts and three appellate courts that
have held these types of claims to be actionable. But
five federal district courts and two appellate courts
disagree, finding that Title VII only prohibits
harassment by someone of the opposite sex.
The Oncale case involves the quid pro quo and
hostile work, environment sexual harassment claims
of Joseph Oncale, who was employed by Sundowner
on an offshore oil rig for three months in 1991.
Oncale alleged that his male supervisor and two male
co-workers sexually harassed him, forcing him to quit
his job.
Relying on the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem No. Am., the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and dismissed Oncale's case. The District Court
specifically looked to the 5th Circuit's statement in
Garcia that harassment of a male subordinate by a
male supervisor does not state a claim under Title
VII. Therefore, the District Court concluded Oncale
did not state a claim against either his supervisor or
his co-workers. Further, the District Court held that
Oncale's co-workers were not "employers" and so
could not be liable under Title VII.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit observed that Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination is
gender-neutral and cited the statements of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc and
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that refer to male or
female victims of sexual harassment. "Under this
reading of the statute," the 5th Circuit noted, "so long
as the plaintiff proves that harassment is because of
the victim's sex, the sex of the harasser and victim is
irrelevant."
However, the 5th Circuit stated that it was bound by
the earlier 5th Circuit panel decision in Garcia and
could not overrule that decision absent a contrary
decision by the 5th Circuit en banc or a superseding
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court of
Appeals toyed with the idea of declaring the Garcia
court's pronouncement regarding same-sex
harassment merely dictum, because it was not
necessary to support the ultimate decision in that
case. But because it was an alternative rationale
supporting the holding, the Court stated that it read
"Garcia's analysis of sexual harassment as binding
precedent," and "must therefore affirm the district
court."
Oncale sought a rehearing by the 5th Circuit en
banc, but was denied on July 12, 1996. Oncale then
filed a petition for writ of certiorari Oct. 10, 1996. On
Dec. 16, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor
General to file briefs on the subject of this case,
expressing the views of the United States. The
Supreme Court has not yet denied or granted cert.
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COURT TAKES UP THORNY ISSUE OF SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Business First Of Columbus
Friday, August 1, 1997
Robert D. Weisman
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to consider
the issue of same-sex sexual harassment. Oral argument
and a decision in the case, Oncale vs. Sundowner
Offshore Services Inc., are expected next term.
The Clinton administration filed a brief on May 20
urging the high court to review this case and rule that
"it should be irrelevant whether the supervisor and
employee are of the same or opposite sex (in a sexual
harassment case)."
The administration also argued that "the plain
language of the statute, prior decisions of this court and
longstanding guidelines of the (Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission) all support the conclusion
that Title VII protects all employees from sex
discrimination, without regard to the gender of the
harasser or the victim."
The question at the heart of the same-sex sexual
harassment issue is whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits gender-based
discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace,
applies in a same-sex harassment situation. Federal
circuit courts are split on this issue.
While at least two courts of appeal have upheld the
actionability of same-sex sexual harassment claims,
three federal courts of appeal have held that same-sex
sexual harassment cases cannot be maintained under
Title VII.
The courts that found that same-sex harassment cases
cannot be maintained under Title VII were not
disputing the fact that these may in fact constitute
instances of harassment, but that they were not
actionable as sexual harassment cases under Title VII.
Even though the harassment was sexual in nature, the
opinion of these courts was that sexual harassment, as
defined in Title VII, was a form of workplace
discrimination and that gender-based discrimination
did not apply in same-sex situations.
The case now before the high court was brought by a
worker who appealed the decision of the 5th Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals. That circuit declined to rule on
the worker's claim that he was harassed in violation of
Title VII by male supervisors and a male co-worker in
1991 aboard an oil rig. The court held that as a matter
of law, same-sex harassment claims are not actionable
under this statute.
In another case, the 6th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals,
which covers Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky and
Tennessee, ruled that when a man sexually propositions
another man, there is a claim for sexual harassment
under Title VII.
According to this court's decision, shortly after Terry
Yeary started working as a part-time cashier, he was
asked out on a date by a male co-worker.
Yeary also claimed that this co-worker later touched
Yeary's chest and stomach and began speaking in an
offensive and harassing manner. On another occasion,
the co-worker grabbed Yeary's arm, pinned him to the
wall and whispered obscene comments about Yeary's
physical appearance. The co-worker also allegedly
called Yeary at home, making lewd and obscene
remarks.
Yeary asserts that he reported the incidents to his
supervisors, who laughed and said that the co-worker
had a history of harassing male employees. Yeary was
allegedly terminated on the same day he raised his
complaints to management.
Yeary sued his employer claiming that because he is
male, he was subjected to objectionable treatment to
which women employees were not subjected. The 6th
Circuit noted that if Yeary's claim that he was sexually
targeted because he is male is true, then he is put at an
institutional disadvantage simply by virtue of the fact of
his gender.
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that it was
not necessary to decide whether same-sex sexual
harassment can be actionable only when the alleged
harasser is homosexual, an issue upon which other
Circuit Courts are divided.
Instead, the Sixth Circuit notes, "all that is necessary
... to observe is that when a male sexually propositions
another male because of sexual attraction, there can be
little question that the behavior is a form of harassment
that occurs because the propositioned male is a male -
that is, 'because of ... sex.' "
The Supreme Court will now consider whether
male-to-male or female-to-female sexual harassment
claims are actionable under Title VII as a matter of law.
If the court decides these cases are actionable, it may
open the door to cases alleging sexual orientation
discrimination in an effort to expand the court's
decision.
These cases clearly highlight the need for employers
to be cognizant of the issue of same-sex sexual
harassment and to seriously consider investigating such
complaints when management is aware or should have
been aware of these types of circumstances.
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT'S NEW TWIST
USA Today
Monday, July 7, 1997
Haya El Nasser
In Houston, a waiter says two male co-workers tried
to pull down his pants in the liquor room. In West
Springfield, Mass., a lumber store employee says a
male supervisor got on the store's public address
system and joked that he had sex with him. And in
Louisiana, a worker on an offshore oil drilling
platform says two men rubbed up against him in the
shower and threatened to sodomize him.
Crude locker-room humor or sexual harassment?
If the targets had been women, the incidents would
be clear legal examples of harassment. And courts
have been open to harassment charges filed by men
against female bosses.
But the courts are now struggling with a new wave
of lawsuits that defies convention: Men charging
other men with sexual harassment. And there's a
new wrinkle in those same-gender suits: heterosexual
men accusing other heterosexual men of sexual
harassment.
Some judges have ruled that the federal law that
protects against sex discrimination applies to men
and women sexually harassed by members of the
same sex. But in a male-on-male case, the 5, Circuit
Court of Appeals in New Orleans said that there is no
such thing as same-gender sex harassment.
High court steps in
Now the U.S. Supreme Court, which in its
just-completed term issued landmark decisions on
cases ranging from the right to die to Internet
censorship, is joining the debate.
It will decide, probably early next year, whether
civil rights law protects a man who is sexually
harassed by another man at work. The ruling is
expected to apply in all cases of same-gender sex
harassment.
Legal experts estimate that there have been at least
50 federal court decisions on same-sex harassment
claims in the past five years, up from a handful in the
1980s.
And now "they're coming out at a rate of two per
month from federal district courts alone," Houston
lawyer Dale Carpenter says.
Most are filed by men against other men, many by
blue-collar workers. But it's not clear how many of
the cases involve heterosexual men.
The experts say the increase may be a result of
changing attitudes about male behavior. There is less
stigma attached to a man complaining of sexual
harassment. And there is a hypersensitivity about any
type of offensive behavior in the workplace.
"Now courts have to accept that there can be sexual
harassment from someone from the same gender,"
says Erwin Chemerinsky, constitutional law
professor at the University of Southern California.
"But how do you know if it's not just people not
being nice to each other?"
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) does not track the numbers of same-gender
harassment claims. But the number filed by men
against both sexes has gone up: 490 in 1990 vs. 1,534
in 1996.
Ten years ago, men who complained of being
sexually harassed by other men "would have been
laughed at; they would have been considered wimps
... poor sports," says Alvin Baraff, director of Men
Center Counseling in Washington, D.C. "Now,
instead of going along with it, they're openly
declaring, 'I don't like it; stop it.' "
Kenneth Billups, for example, is suing his former
employer, Ninfa's Inc., a Houston chain of Mexican
restaurants, accusing it of discrimination. Billups is
gay. While working as a waiter, he says, he was
harassed by male co-workers, both gay and
heterosexual.
"The cashier would follow me when I went into the
bathroom and would try to come in to the stall. Two
other guys were always grabbing me and trying to
pull me in the liquor room to take my pants off," says
Billups, 40.
He says he complained to supervisors but nothing
was done. Ninfa's denies the allegations and says it
does not condone harassment or discrimination of
any kind.
Billups filed a complaint with the EEOC, then quit
his job. But because Texas is part of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Billups' suit is in limbo until the
Supreme Court rules.
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Employers envision a surge in lawsuits if the
Supreme Court says federal law covers same-sex
harassment. And they predict stricter codes of
conduct at work.
"That means no dirty jokes, even if it's among the
guys," says Carla Walworth, employment law expert
in Stamford, Conn. "No Playboys. No more Animal
House pranks."
Civil rights
It's doubtful that lawmakers could have dreamed up
such a scenario when they enacted Title VII of the
U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964. The act makes it
illegal for employers "to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." For more
than a decade, courts have agreed that sexual
harassment on the job is discrimination based on sex.
Many courts have said the same rules apply when
men or women complained of sexual advances by
supervisors who are gay or lesbian. But most lower
courts have rejected harassment claims when
everyone involved is of the same sex and no one is
homosexual.
Gay rights groups say that someone's sexual
orientation should have little to do with deciding the
validity of a sexual harassment claim.
"There isn't anything in the law that provides that
any conduct that occurs between people of the same
sex should be judged any differently than the conduct
of people of different sexes," says Beatrice Dohrn, of
the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, a
gay rights group.
The Supreme Court could resolve the issue when it
rules on Joseph Oncale's case.
Oncale filed an employment discrimination suit
against Sundowner Offshore Services. He says he was
forced to quit his job on an oil-drilling platform in
Louisiana in 1991 because of repeated harassment.
He says two co-workers rubbed their penises against
him. Co-workers even threatened him with anal
intercourse in the shower, he says.
The company says the incidents were heterosexual
horseplay, and a federal judge threw out Oncale's
claim before trial.
The U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals said that even
if the incidents occurred, they did not violate the law.
Oncale appealed,and last month the EEOC and the
Justice Department urged the Supreme Court to hear
the case.
If the court rules in his favor, lower courts will still
have to decide, case by case, if behavior alleged by
people like Oncale constitutes horseplay or sexual
harassment.
"It used to be that if someone called someone a
mama's boy, they'd punch you in the nose. Now it's
a question of whether that's male-on-male sexual
harassment," Walworth says. "Is Title VII becoming
a good-manners statute?"
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Joseph ONCALE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC., John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and Brandon
Johnson, Defendants-Appellees.
83 F.3d 118
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 20, 1996.
DUHE, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Joseph Oncale filed this suit against Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., ("Sundowner"), John Lyons,
Danny Pippen and Brandon Johnson, alleging that he had been sexually harassed during his employment in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"). The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed Oncale's case. Because our decision in Garcia
v. Elf Atochem No. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994), holds that same-sex harassment is not cognizable
under Title VII, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Joseph Oncale was employed by Sundowner on an offshore rig from August to November 1991. Oncale filed this
Title VII action against Sundowner, John Lyons, his Sundowner supervisor, and Danny Pippen and Brandon
Johnson, two Sundowner co-workers, alleging sexual harassment. Oncale alleges that the harassment included
Pippen and Johnson restraining him while Lyons placed his penis on Oncale's neck, on one occasion, and on
Oncale's arm, on another occasion; threats of homosexual rape by Lyons and Pippen; and the use of force by Lyons
to push a bar of soap into Oncale's anus while Pippen restrained Oncale as he was showering on Sundowner
premises. Oncale alleges both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment. Oncale quit his job
at Sundowner soon after the shower incident.
The district court granted summary judgment on Oncale's Title VII claim, relying upon our statement in Garcia
v. Elf Atochem No. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994), that harassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII. Thus, the court concluded that it was "compelled to find that
Mr. Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers." Finally, the court
found that Oncale's co-workers, Pippen and Johnson, could not be held liable as "employers" under Title VII.
DISCUSSION
Precedential Value of Garcia
Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with
respect to ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex...." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). Appellant and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (as Amicus Curiae ) argue that
Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination and the Supreme Court's sexual harassment decisions are
formulated in gender-neutral terms, and therefore, prohibit all discrimination because of sex, whether it is
discrimination against men or women. Under this reading of the statute, so long as the plaintiff proves that the
harassment is because of the victim's sex, the sex of the harasser and victim is irrelevant.
This panel, however, cannot review the merits of Appellant's Title VII argument on a clean slate. We are bound
by our decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem No. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994), and must therefore affirm
the district court. Although our analysis in Garcia has been rejected by various district courts, we cannot overrule
a prior panel's decision. In this Circuit, one panel may not overrule the decision, right or wrong, of a prior panel
in the absence of an intervening contrary or superseding decision by the Court en banc or the Supreme Court.
This Circuit's same-sex Title VII jurisprudence began with Giddens v. Shell Oil Co. 311, 130 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994).
Although the holding in that case is not entirely clear, it appears that the Court ruled that male-on-male harassment
with sexual overtones is not sex discrimination without a showing that an employer treated the plaintiff differentlybecause of his sex. Next, in Garcia, we extended Giddens to bar all same-sex sexual harassment claims:
Finally, we held in Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 [12 F.3d 208] (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993) (unpublished),that '[hlarassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even
though the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination.' Accord Goluszek v.Smith, 697 F.Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D.II1. 1988). Thus, what Locke did to Garcia could not in any event constitute
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sexual harassment within the purview of Title VII, and hence summary judgment in favor of all defendants was
proper on this basis also.
This discussion seems to indicate clearly that same-sex harassment claims are not viable under Title VII. When
read in its proper context, however, this final paragraph of the Garcia opinion poses an interpretive problem.
Because the Court had already found an independent basis to affirm the grant of summary judgment to each
defendant, no part of this analysis is necessary to support the ultimate decision. Thus, the question arises whether
we should treat Garcia 's pronouncement on same-sex sexual harassment as binding precedent or dictum. When
faced with this issue, some district courts in this Circuit (like the trial court here) have applied Garcia to dismiss
same-sex harassment claims. Others, by contrast, have ruled that Garcia 's statements about same-sex harassment
are dicta.
We read Garcia 's analysis of sexual harassment as binding precedent. After stating that Title VII does not
recognize male-on-male claims, the Court explicitly stated that summary judgment "was proper on this basis also."
This language suggests that the same-sex rationale for rejecting Garcia's claim is an alternative holding, which we
treat as stare decisis in this Circuit. "It has long been settled that all alternative rationales for a given result have
precedential value. 'It does not make a reason given for a conclusion obiter dictum, because it is the only one of
two reasons for the same conclusion.' " Moreover, another panel of this Court has recognized Garcia as binding
precedent on the issue of same-sex harassment, thereby resolving any uncertainty about Garcia 's precedential force.
Therefore, Garcia remains the law of this Circuit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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96-1337 SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CALIF. V. LEWIS
Ruling below (CA 9, 98 F.3d 434, 65 LW 2319, 60 CrL 1078):
High-speed police chase that culminates in injury or death of
fleeing motorist violates substantive component of Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and is actionable under 42 USC
1983 if officer acted with deliberate indifference to, or reckless
disregard for, motorist's rights to life and personal security; in light
of case law dealing with excessive force in context of
unconstitutional seizures, as well as cases from other circuits
dealing with police chases, police officer who carried out ultimately
fatal high speed chase of motorcycle ridden by two teenage boys
who were apparently breaking no law was on notice that he could
be liable if he caused death or injury to someone through
sufficiently egregious conduct, and, therefor, officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity.
Questions presented: (1) In police pursuit case, is legal standard of
conduct necessary to establish violation of substantive due process
under Fourteenth Amendment "shocks conscience" test, as
determined by this court in Collins v. Harker Heights, Texas, 503
U.S. 115, 60 LW 4182 (1992), and other circuit court cases, or is
standard "deliberate indifference" or "reckless disregard," as
determined by Ninth Circuit in this case? (2) In police pursuit case,
was legal standard of conduct necessary to establish violation of
substantive due process under Fourteenth Amendment clearly
established for purpose of granting qualified immunity to peace
officer, in view of conflict between standard set out in Collins and
decisions of circuit courts requiring conduct that "shocks
conscience" and holding by Ninth Circuit in this case that conduct
be "deliberately indifferent"? (3) Is peace officer involved in police
pursuit entitled to qualified immunity in case in which reasonable
officer could not have known he may have been violating law due
to conflicting legal standards of conduct, and factual contours of
legal standard are not sufficiently defined?
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COURT TO RULE ON SUIT OVER POLICE CHASE
The Sacramento Bee
Tuesday, June 3, 1997
Herbert A. Sample
Accepting a case that could set a national standard of
police conduct in high-speed chases, the U.S. Supreme
Court on Monday agreed to consider whether the
parents of a Sacramento County teenager killed during
a high-speed chase can sue for civil rights violations.
Without comment, the court said it would hear
arguments in the case sometime during its next term,
which begins in October and runs through June 1998.
The court's action comes amid growing controversy
over the rising number of deaths from high-speed
pursuits by law enforcement authorities. In response,
some cities have enacted ordinances that limit police
discretion in chasing suspects at high speeds.
Parents of the victim asked the court to declare that
police officers should be held to answer for conduct that
displays "reckless disregard" or "deliberate
indifference" to another person. But Sacramento
County, along with attorneys general in California and
13 other states, urged a higher burden of proof -- a
showing that the officer's conduct would "shock the
conscience" before a lawsuit could proceed.
The case arose on the evening of May 22, 1990, in
Orangevale when Phillip Lewis, 16, was riding as a
passenger on his motorcycle, driven by a friend, Brian
Willard. The two teens approached a pair of
Sacramento County sheriffs deputies at high speed and
ignored orders to halt.
One of the officers, James Smith, pursued the
motorcycle as it negotiated streets and nearly caused
accidents with two other vehicles and a bicyclist. On
Chestnut Avenue, Willard tried to make a turn but the
brakes locked and the motorcycle skidded to a halt.
Smith also tried to stop, skidding some 166 feet, but
his car collided with the motorcycle and Lewis, who
was thrown nearly 70 feet. The teen died at the scene.
The 1.3-mile chase lasted about 75 seconds.
Willard did not suffer major injuries, but he later
pleaded no contest to felony hit-and-run, failing to stop
for a police officer and fleeing an accident that resulted
in death.
Almost a year later, Teri and Thomas Lewis, Phillip's
parents, filed a lawsuit against Smith, the Sheriffs
Department and the county. They alleged their son's
14th Amendment right to due process was violated
when Smith chased him at high speed, at night, through
residential areas, for insufficient reason.
"Under those circumstances, that is outrageous
conduct and that outrageous conduct was consciously
disregarding the life and safety of those (the deputy is)
sworn to protect," Paul Hedlund, the parents' attorney,
said in an interview.
A federal trial court judge threw the case out, saying
the law on the qualified immunity police officers have
from due-process lawsuits was unsettled and, therefore,
officers could not be held to a murky standard.
But the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overruled
that decision, saying the law was clear. It said lawsuits
alleging 14th Amendment violations arising from
police chases have only to demonstrate that an officer
recklessly disregarded or was deliberately indifferent to
those rights.
The county then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
accept the case and reverse the appeals decision.
In its brief, the county argued the appeals court ruling
conflicted with a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision
requiring 14 Amendment claims to demonstrate
actions that are "shocking to the conscience." The cited
case, though, did not involve police.
The county also asserted the 9th Circuit ruling was at
odds with decisions in similar cases in other appellate
jurisdictions.
"Anytime a peace officer initiates a vehicle pursuit of
a fleeing suspect, there is a significant potential for
danger," the county's brief said. "Law enforcement, by
its very nature, involves dealing with situations in
which both the officer and the suspect are in harm's
way. It does not follow that an officer should not qualify
for immunity as a result."
California Attorney General Dan Lungren, joined by
attorneys general from 13 other states, also pressed for
a hearing. In a friend-of-the-court brief, Lungren
asserted that the 9th Circuit standard of reckless
disregard or deliberate indifference was too low. "The
standard . . cripples law enforcement by turning
unintentional conduct into civil rights violations,"
Lungren stated in his brief.
Hedlund said all he and Lewis' parents want is their
day in court.
"The 9th Circuit did not say as a matter of law that
this deputy had committed a violation of the 14th
Amendment," he said. "All it said was that I have a
right to present it to a jury."
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JUSTICES TO RULE ON POLICE LIABILITY IN HIGH SPEED CHASES
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, June 3, 1997
David G. Savage
Agreeing to hear an appeal from California law
enforcement officials, the Supreme Court announced
Monday that it will rule on whether police who pursue
vehicles at high speeds can be held liable if the
suspects are injured or killed.
The decision, due early next year, probably will
determine the future of high-speed police pursuits.
In a sharply disputed ruling, the U.S. 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals said in October that police could be
forced to pay damages if officers showed a "reckless
disregard" for the fleeing suspect's life and safety when
they undertook the chase.
The ruling cleared the way for a trial against a
Sacramento officer who in 1990 pursued two youths on
a speeding motorcycle. When a 16-year-old fell from
the motorcycle on a sharp turn, he was run over by the
police car. His parents then sued Officer James E.
Smith for damages, alleging that he violated their son's
constitutional rights.
While many federal courts have shielded police from
such claims, the 9th Circuit said "any reasonable
officer" would know that such high-speed pursuits are
dangerous. Ajury must decide whether Smith showed
a "deliberate indifference or reckless disregard" for the
boy's life when he undertook the chase, the appeals
court said.
In an unusual move, lawyers for the cities of Los
Angeles and Beverly Hills and for San Diego and
Riverside counties, along with California Atty. Gen.
Dan Lungren, joined Sacramento County in urging the
justices to intervene and reverse the appeals court
decision.
They said the ruling would allow dangerous criminals
to flee with impunity and in fact would encourage
them to speed away from officers.
"Those who flee lawful authority in a dangerous and
reckless manner generally do so because they have
conunitted serious crimes," they argued.
Between 1994 and 1996, the Los Angeles Police
Department said its officers engaged in 2,200
vehicular pursuits. Statewide, more than 5,000 such
pursuits occurred in 1994, state officials said.
"For better or worse, police pursuits .. . have become
a fixture of everyday police practice," they said.
However, a lawyer for the family of the 16-year-old
who died said the case shows the need to restrict
high-speed pursuits.
"The statistics on high-speed chases are appalling.
The police are killing people under the rubric of
apprehending criminals," said Paul J. Hedlund, a Los
Angeles lawyer for the parents of Philip Lewis, the
deceased youth. "These people mostly haven't done
anything serious, but they panic and flee."
He said the two youths had been in some trouble
earlier and were not supposed to be together. As a
result, when they came upon a police car on the
evening of May 22, 1990, they sped away on a
Sacramento street. Smith pursued the motorcycle at
speeds of up to 80 miles per hour.
"This is not a case in which officers were pursuing
dangerous felons," wrote Judge Harry Pregerson of the
9th Circuit Court. His opinion established the law for
the nine-state Western region.
In urging the justices to review the matter, lawyers
for the police departments argued that officers often do
not know in advance whether the fleeing suspects are
dangerous criminals or simply scared youths.
Therefore, they said, jurors should not be allowed to
second-guess an officer's decision long after the fact.
The justices will hear arguments in the case
(Sacramento County vs. Lewis 96- 1337) in the fall.
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COURT TO SETTLE DEBATE ON POLICE LIABILITY
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
June 12, 1997
James G Sotos
U.S. Supreme Court to review decision holding that
police officers may be liable for conducting high-speed
chases with deliberate indifference or reckless
disregard to the safety of others. Lewis v. Sacramento
County, 98 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, No.
96-1137, 65 LW 3793 (June 2).
The U.S. Supreme Court last week agreed to review a
case that likely will have wide-ranging effect on the
liability police officers face under the Civil Rights Act.
The top court accepted an appeal from the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling that police officers
may be held liable under the act, 42 U.S.C. [secl 1983,
for deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the
safety of others when they conduct high-speed pursuits.
The case began at about 8:30 p.m. on May 22, 1990,
when James Everett Smith, a Sacramento County,
Calif., deputy sheriff, arrived at the scene of a fight.
Also there was Murray Stapp, a police officer for the
City of Sacramento. As the officers were preparing to
leave the scene, Stapp yelled something at two boys
passing by on a motorcycle and activated the lights on
his squad car. The boys apparently ignored Stapp and
rode off. Neither the driver of the motorcycle, Brian
Willard, nor the passenger, Philip Lewis, wore
helmets. Lewis was 16 years old.
Smith gave chase. The pursuit covered 1.3 miles and
reached speeds of up to 100 mph - in zones with speed
limits of as low as 30.
The chase ended when the motorcycle topped a crest
and skidded to a halt. Seconds later, Smith's squad car
came flying over the rise at a minimum of 65 mph, and
Smith slammed on the brakes when he saw the stopped
motorcycle. He couldn't stop in time. The squad car
slammed into Lewis at about 45 mph. It was unclear
whether Lewis was still on the motorcycle or whether
he had stepped off of the bike when Smith hit him.
Lewis was pronounced dead at the scene. The driver,
Willard, sustained no major injuries.
Lewis' parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, filed a civil
rights lawsuit against Sacramento County and Smith.
U.S. District Judge Garland E. Burrell of the Eastern
District of California granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants, finding no constitutional
violations. The Lewises appealed.
The 9th Circuit reversed, finding that the Lewises had
garnered sufficient evidence to warrant a jury trial on
their claims. Writing for the court, Judge Harry
Pregerson initially noted that the Lewises could not
pursue a claim against Smith and the County under the
Fourth Amendment because they had not established
that Smith's inadvertent act of crashing into their son
constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment:
"It is undisputed that Smith did not intend to hit
Lewis with his patrol car. There was thus no Fourth
Amendment violation. See Brower v. County of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593 (1989) (holding that Fourth Amendment
seizure only occurs 'when there is governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied')."
The appeals court then analyzed the plaintiffs' claim
under the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The
court noted that while Philip Lewis was undeniably
deprived of his life as a result of the crash, determining
whether he died without due process of law was a more
difficult question. The court noted that determining the
appropriate level of culpability that should govern
police liability under the Civil Rights Act for chases
had created confusion among the federal circuits:
"Five circuits have addressed section 1983 liability in
the context of high- speed pursuits. These circuits have
applied various labels to the standard of conduct that
may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of
Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(overruling previous reckless indifference standard and
adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v.
City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th
Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick
County Commissioners, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir.
1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1095, 112 S.Ct. 1172, 117 L.Ed.2d 417 (1992); Roach
v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir.
1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not
stating what standard should be applied); Jones v.
Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in
some circumstances)."
In looking for the proper standard, the 9th Circuit
noted that on one end of the spectrum intentional
police misconduct during a chase clearly would
amount to a due process violation, while simple
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negligence would not. In between lie several
possibilities, including gross negligence, recklessness,
deliberate indifference, conscious disregard and
conduct that "shocks the conscience." Pregerson settled
on deliberate indifference or recklessness, which he
regarded as substantially equivalent:
"[I]n this circuit, an officer can be held liable of a
section 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is
deliberately indifferent or in reckless disregard of a
person's right to life and personal security.
"We recognize that courts should be hesitant to
second-guess government officials when they must
make swift decisions regarding public safety. But even
swift decisions, if arbitrary, may violate the 14th
Amendment. We believe that the appropriate degree of
fault to be applied to high-speed police pursuits is
deliberate indifference to, or reckless disregard for, a
person's right to life and personal security. Deliberate
indifference is the greatest degree of misconduct we
have previously required a plaintiff to prove to sustain
a section 1983 action against a law enforcement officer
for violating rights protected by the 14th Amendment's
due process clause. We do not here decide whether
deliberate indifference or reckless disregard is the
minimum standard for all substantive due process
violations; we decide only that this standard of conduct
is the minimum required to sustain a section 1983
claim in the context of a high-speed police pursuit."
Applying that standard, the appeals court concluded
that the Lewises were entitled to a trial:
"[P]laintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated
the Sacramento County sheriffs department general
order regarding pursuits by instituting and then
continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer
would have known that to do so was in reckless
disregard of Lewis' and Willard's safety. A violation of
police procedures is relevant to determine whether a
substantive due process violation has occurred. Police
procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers
when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk
of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. ...
"Moreover, there is no evidence that Officer Smith
suspected Lewis or Willard of violating any law when
he decided to institute the chase. The only alleged
violations were traffic infractions that occurred during
the pursuit itself. Smith pursued the boys simply
because they did not stop when another officer told
them to do so. This is not a case in which officers were
pursuing dangerous felons. The record does not
indicate that Lewis or Willard would have posed a risk
to public safety had they gotten away. Nor is there any
evidence indicating that the boys would have been
driving recklessly had they not been pursued by Smith.
The simplest means of negating any danger the boys
posed to the public would have been for Smith to
discontinue the pursuit. ...
"When we construe the facts in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that there remains
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer
Smith acted with deliberate indifference to or in
reckless disregard of Lewis' due process rights to life
and personal security."
In deciding to review the 9th Circuit's decision, the
Supreme Court has an opportunity to give federal
courts much needed guidance in defining the
circumstances where police may face liability under
the due process clause. The Lewis case is scheduled for
oral argument in the fall, and a decision is expected
early next year.
Copyright 1997
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THE LAW OF HOT PURSUIT
Monday, August 4, 1997
James J. Kilpatrick
Universal Press Syndicate
On a May evening seven years ago, 16-year-old Philip
Lewis died of massive internal injuries and a fractured
skull. He was the victim of a high-speed police pursuit
in Sacramento County, Calif. In its coming October
term, the Supreme Court will review the resulting
lawsuit.
The case is important to law enforcement officers
across the nation. They need clear rules of the chase.
The case is also important to civilians who may be
injured or killed as a consequence of police pursuit.
How often do police officers turn on their sirens for a
hot pursuit? Briefs in the Lewis case assert that in 1994
officers in California alone made more than 5,000
pursuits. The city of Los Angeles averages about 700
chases a year. Court records show that scores -- more
likely hundreds -- of victims have gone to court.
These were the undisputed facts in the Lewis case. The
youth was a passenger on a motorcycle driven by Brian
Willard. For no apparent reason, Deputy Sheriff James
Everett Smith, driving a marked patrol car, yelled at
Willard to pull over and stop. Instead of stopping,
Willard accelerated and sped away.
From an opinion last October of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit:
"The pursuit lasted about 75 seconds and covered
approximately 1.3 miles. The average speed of the
vehicles was calculated to be 60 miles per hour, with
high speeds of up to 100 miles per hour. The pursuit
went through four stoplights and three 90-degree left
turns ...
"The chase ended when the motorcycle went over a
crest in the road, attempted to make a hard-left turn,
and skidded to a halt Smith saw the vehicle as he came
over the crest of the hill. He slammed on his brakes but
was unable to stop his vehicle in time. After skidding
147 feet, his patrol car hit Lewis at a speed of
approximately 40 miles per hour, propelling Lewis
nearly 70 feet down the road. Lewis was pronounced
dead at the scene."
You should consider these other elements: The county
sheriffs department had laid down a General Order.
The order requires an officer to consider, before
initiating a pursuit, whether the seriousness of an
offense justifies a chase at high speed, and whether a
pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and
property. In the Lewis case, the only offense was
Willard's refusal to stop on the deputy's order.
In their suit, Lewis' parents contend that Smith, under
color of law, deprived their son of a constitutional right
to life in violation of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. The 9' Circuit agreed -- the suit may
proceed to trial. Now the high court has the case.
The federal circuit courts have grappled with
definitions in this field for the past 10 years. Ask
yourself: Did Deputy Smith evidence deliberate
indifference to the boy's rights? Was it reckless
indifference, reckless disregard, callous disregard, gross
negligence, outrageous conduct, or did it shock the
conscience of a trial court?
All these terms have turned up in cases since 1987.
Exhibiting "deliberate indifference" is the easiest
standard for fixing liability, "shocking the conscience"
the most difficult to establish. My own thought is that
Deputy Smith demonstrated at least a reckless disregard
for the boy's life, but there's another side that merits
consideration.
In briefs filed with the high court, 15 states contend
through their attorneys general that the 9th Circuit's
easy standard of "deliberate indifference" will play
havoc with law enforcement. Few hot pursuits result in
death or injury, but roughly 73 percent of police chases
result in the apprehension of persons charged with a
felony. As a tool to combat serious crime, police pursuit
generally serves the public well.
"If the Lewis decision stands," the states contend, "law
enforcement entities will be forced to decide whether or
not they can AFFORD to continue to engage in
high-speed vehicular pursuits." Every pursuit that
results in an injury will lead to the filing of a civil
rights action. State highway patrols may have to
abandon high-speed pursuits in all but the most
compelling circumstances. Drunk drivers and serious
felons will flee at the first sound of a pursuing siren,
leaving officers without effective means of enforcing the
law.
The policeman's lot is not a happy one. One can
appreciate an officer's difficulty in deciding in a
stressful few seconds whether to initiate a chase. One
can also appreciate the position of parents who have
lost a son because of the "deliberate indifference" of a
deputy sheriff.
Distributed by Universal Press Syndicate
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PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case involves a high-speed pursuit of two teenagers on a motorcycle by a law enforcement
officer in a patrol car. One of the teenagers was killed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse
the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity as to the officer but affirm the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the municipal defendants.
I.
Because this case comes before us on summary judgment, the following facts are presented in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs.
On the evening of May 22, 1990, at about 8:30 p.m., James Everett Smith, a Sacramento County sheriffs deputy,
along with Murray Stapp, a Sacramento police officer, responded to a call to break up a fight. After handling the
call, the officers returned to their separate patrol cars. As they were preparing to leave, Officer Smith saw Stapp's
overhead lights come on and saw him yell something at two boys riding a motorcycle. Apparently, the windows
of Smith's patrol car were up, so Smith could not hear what Stapp yelled at the boys. Neither boy was involved in
the altercation-they just happened to ride by.
Brian Willard was driving the motorcycle, and Philip Lewis, the decedent, was a passenger. Both boys were
minors; Lewis was sixteen. Neither boy wore a helmet. Stapp pulled his vehicle closer to Smith's to keep the
motorcycle from leaving, but Willard drove the motorcycle slowly between the two cars and then accelerated away.
Smith executed a three-point turn and initiated a high-speed pursuit.
The pursuit lasted about seventy-five seconds and covered approximately 1.3 miles. Posted speed limits were as
low as 30 miles per hour. The average speed of the vehicles was calculated to be 60 miles per hour, with high
speeds of up to 100 miles per hour. The pursuit went through four stop lights and three ninety-degree left turns.
During the pursuit, Smith's patrol car followed the motorcycle at a distance of as little as 100-150 feet, even though
Smith drove at a speed that would have required 650 feet for him to stop his car. Smith was also driving at such
a speed that his stopping distance was beyond the range of his headlights.
The chase ended when the motorcycle went over a crest in the road, attempted to make a hard left turn, and
skidded to a halt. It is unclear whether Lewis remained seated on the motorcycle or got off. Smith saw the stopped
motorcycle as he came over the crest of the hill. He slammed on his brakes but was unable to stop his vehicle in
time. Smith was driving at a minimum of 65 miles per hour when he began braking. After skidding 147 feet, his
patrol car hit Lewis at a speed of approximately 40 miles per hour, propelling Lewis nearly 70 feet down the road.
Smith's car continued off the road, coming to rest in a residential front yard after knocking over a mailbox.
Lewis suffered massive internal injuries and a fractured skull. He was pronounced dead at the scene. Willard, the
motorcycle driver, suffered no major injuries.
Plaintiffs Teri and Thomas Lewis, Philip Lewis's parents, filed suit in Sacramento County Superior Court against
Sacramento County, the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department, and Officer Smith. The Lewises allege a
deprivation of their son's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and wrongful
death under California state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal questionjurisdiction and moved for summary judgment on various grounds.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the § 1983 claims. The court also
granted summary judgment in favor of Smith as to the state causes of action. The court denied summary judgment
as to the pendent state law causes of action against the County and the Sheriffs department, dismissing those claims
without prejudice. The district court's decisions are summarized below.
First, the district court assumed, without deciding, that Officer Smith had violated Lewis's constitutional rights.
The court then addressed Smith's claim to qualified immunity. The court stated that plaintiffs had not presented,
and it could not find, any "state or federal opinion published before May, 1990, when the alleged misconduct took
place, that supports plaintiffs' view that they have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right in the
context of high speed police pursuits." The court therefore found that the law regarding Lewis's Fourteenth
Amendment right to life and personal security was not clearly established and granted summary judgment in favor
of Officer Smith on qualified immunity grounds.
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Second, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and the sheriffs department on plaintiffs'
claim that both entities had failed to adequately train sheriffs deputies in high-speed pursuits. The court found that,
although Smith had received no training in pursuits, he had received training in high-speed driving and that the
driving skills overlapped to some extent. The court thus concluded that the training procedures were "not so
inherently inadequate" that the sheriffs department and the county could be held liable under § 1983 for inadequate
training.
Third, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriffs department, finding that its pursuit policy was
not deliberately indifferent to Lewis's constitutional rights. The court reasoned that the department's policy
exceeded California statutory standards and carefully delineated the factors an officer should consider before
initiating or continuing a high-speed pursuit.
Plaintiffs appeal.
H.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. We must determine, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether
the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the
truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial.
A.
To sustain a § 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed
by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal
constitutional or statutory right." Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At
issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department, or Sacramento County engaged
in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected right.
The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'"
Lewis's claim as presented to us is properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." But not every government-caused deprivation of a right is a constitutional violation.
"[T] he Due Process Clause 'does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to
regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society....'" But when a law enforcement officer
arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties,
constitutional due process rights may be implicated.
Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the
underlying constitutional right." The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process
rights to life and liberty or personal security.
In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere
negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels expressly left open the question whether
something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the
protections of the Due Process Clause." But in City of Canton v. Harris the Court held that non-intentional
government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to § 1983 liability. City of Canton held that
a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate
indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact."
Five circuits have addressed § 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied
various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability.
While we have not specifically addressed the standard of conduct to be applied to law enforcement officers in the
context of high-speed vehicular pursuits, we have addressed the standard of conduct expected of officers in other
types of substantive due process cases.
In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or 'deliberate indifference' " was
sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that
"grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause
is actionable under § 1983." But Fargo 's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was
modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent
standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, had called into question this
standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo.
In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability
necessary to maintain a § 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate
training of police officers. City of Canton, The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its
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employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a 'deliberate
indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard
"does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a
constitutional violation." City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo
because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
Following the Court's decision in City of Canton, we granted rehearing and issued a new opinion, Wood II, that
disavowed the gross negligence standard set out in our opinion in Wood I. Wood II also had the effect of modifying
Fargo to the extent that Fargo relied explicitly on Wood I in setting a gross negligence standard-the modification
of Wood I eliminated the legal foundation for Fargo.
In sum, it is clear from Wood II that Wood I and Fargo are no longer good law to the extent that they set a standard
of gross negligence for § 1983 violations. "Bare" gross negligence is never sufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim for
a substantive due process violation. It is also clear that deliberate indifference is always sufficient. Fargo and
Wood H are helpful in defining the meaning of these standards and in shedding light on the murky area that lies
between the two standards.
In Fargo, a police officer accidentally shot plaintiff Fargo in the back while trying to handcuff him. Fargo sued
under § 1983 for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of all defendants without explaining its ruling. On appeal, defendants argued that
Fargo's claims were barred by Daniels because the officer's conduct, at most, constituted mere negligence. We
rejected that argument, holding that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest
protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under § 1983."
In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as " 'more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than
conscious indifference to the consequences.'" We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim
based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Although
we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may
be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent
in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a 'conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642
n. 7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, 'negligence can rise to the level
of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact
remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to
determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness.
In Wood II, we redefined the standard for § 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As
explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton had called into question our
decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of
Canton 's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs interest in her personal
security.
In Wood, a police officer arrested the driver of the car in which plaintiff Wood was a passenger and impounded
the car. The officer then drove away, leaving Wood stranded, at night, alone in a high-crime area. Wood accepted
a ride with an unknown man. This man took Wood to a secluded area and raped her. Although we did not fix the
level of culpability required for a due process violation, we did conclude that deliberate indifference or callous
disregard was certainly sufficient. We also noted that there was a triable, if not an undisputed issue of fact as to
whether the police officer had knowledge of the danger in which he placed Wood. We observed that "the inherent
danger facing a woman left alone at night in an unsafe area is a matter of common sense."
Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a § 1983 claim if that officer's conduct
is deliberately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
We recognize that courts should be hesitant to second-guess government officials when they must make swift
decisions regarding public safety. But even swift decisions, if arbitrary, may violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
We believe that the appropriate degree of fault to be applied to high-speed police pursuits is deliberate indifference
to, or reckless disregard for, a person's right to life and personal security. Deliberate indifference is the greatest
degree of misconduct we have previously required a plaintiff to prove to sustain a § 1983 action against a law
enforcement officer for violating rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. We do not
here decide whether deliberate indifference or reckless disregard is the minimum standard for all substantive due
process violations; we decide only that this standard of conduct is the minimum required to sustain a § 1983 claim
in the context of a high-speed police pursuit.
Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department General
Order regarding pursuits ("General Order") by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable
officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of
police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Police
procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm
to either a suspect or to the general public.
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The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriffs department
dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order
requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the
posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to
do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit
under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop.
The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and
property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard
to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards
of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved
in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Officer Smith suspected Lewis or Willard of violating any law when he decided
to institute the chase. The only alleged violations were traffic infractions that occurred during the pursuit itself.
Smith pursued the boys simply because they did not stop when another officer told them to do so. This is not a case
in which officers were pursuing dangerous felons. The record does not indicate that Lewis or Willard would have
posed a risk to public safety had they gotten away. Nor is there any evidence indicating that the boys would have
been driving recklessly had they not been pursued by Lewis. The simplest means of negating any danger the boys
posed to the public would have been for Smith to discontinue the pursuit.
Indeed, the dangers created by the chase were great. At least two cars and one bicyclist were forced off the road
during the course of the chase. The pursued vehicle was a motorcycle, offering no protection to its riders. Both
boys were minors. Neither was wearing a helmet. The chase was at night, in a residential area, and hit speeds of
up to 100 miles per hour. Smith could not have stopped his car within the range of his headlights. Finally, even
though Officer Smith was familiar with the area, he crested a hill blindly at a speed of about 65 miles per hour.
At that speed, Smith's patrol car skidded 147 feet before striking Lewis, traveled another nineteen feet before
leaving the roadway, knocked over a mailbox, and came to rest 32 feet further in a residential front yard. The
enormity of the danger to Lewis and Willard and to the general public was readily apparent.
When we construe the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that there remains a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Officer Smith acted with deliberate indifference to or in reckless disregard of Lewis's
due process rights to life and personal security.
B.
The next issue we address is whether the law was clearly established such that a reasonable officer, in the
circumstances of this case, would have known that his conduct was unlawful.
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials from liability unless their actions "violate 'clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " The "central
purpose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them 'from undue interference with
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.' "
Qualified immunity, of course, is not absolute. Allowing suits against government officials and government
entities fulfills an important purpose: "deterring public officials' unlawful actions and compensating victims of such
conduct."
Whether a government official "is entitled to qualified immunity turns on a two part inquiry: '(1) Was the law
governing the official's conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law, could a reasonable officer have believed
the conduct was lawful?'" "This does not mean that any official action is protected by qualified immunity 'unless
the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,' but it does require that 'in the light of pre-existing
law the unlawfulness must be apparent.' " We also note that there is danger in defining the right in question too
narrowly. To do so would be to allow defendants "to define away all potential claims."
Here, the district court found that, in May 1990, the law regarding substantive due process rights in the context
of high-speed police chases was not clearly established and that Officer Smith was therefore entitled to qualified
immunity. The court reasoned that plaintiffs had failed to provide any state or federal court opinion published
before May 1990 that would "support[ I plaintiffs' view that they have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process right in the context of high speed police pursuits." The court also stated that it had no obligation to
independently research the law because plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the law was clearly established.
Our review of the issue of qualified immunity must be "conducted in light of all relevant precedent, not simply
those cited to or discovered by the district court." Relevant precedent is not limited to cases regarding the "very
action in question." Cases involving law enforcement officers' excessive use of force in the context of
unconstitutional seizures were sufficiently analogous to put Smith on notice that, if he caused death or injury to
someone through sufficiently egregious conduct, he could be liable under § 1983.
"An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law is not clearly established every time
a novel method is used to inflict injury." Common sense is relevant to the inquiry as to whether the contours of
the right at issue were clearly established.
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In addition to Garner and Brower, three other federal cases put officer Smith on notice that he could be found liable
for his conduct during a high- speed pursuit. These § 1983 cases, involving high-speed pursuits, were published
before May 1990: These cases sent a clear message that conduct that is sufficiently egregious may lead to § 1983
liability.
Each of these three cases, Roach, Jones, and Checki, sent a clear message that a police officer can be held liable
if his conduct is sufficiently egregious, i.e., conduct somewhere beyond gross negligence. These cases put Smith
on constructive, if not actual notice, that he could be sued for violating Lewis's Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights during a police chase. Thus, the law regarding police liability for death or injury caused by an officer during
the course of a high-speed chase was clearly established. If that officer's conduct was sufficiently egregious, he
would be liable.
The next issue is whether, in the circumstances of this case, a reasonable officer in Smith's position could have
believed his conduct was lawful. Both Fargo and Wood demonstrate that police conduct, if sufficiently egregious,
is unlawful if that conduct violates someone's right to personal security. A reasonable officer in Smith's
circumstances would have been aware that if his conduct was sufficiently egregious, resulting in either injury or
death to Lewis or Willard, he could be held liable.
Defendants allege that the law regarding police pursuits was not so clearly established that a reasonable officer
would have known that the mere decision to pursue a fleeing suspect could potentially violate that suspect's due
process rights. But defendants' allegations misconstrue the focus of the inquiry. It was not Smith's "mere decision
to pursue a fleeing suspect" that we analyze. What we must look at is both Smith's decision to institute the pursuit
and the manner in which he conducted it. Smith must have known that he was placing Lewis and Willard in great
physical danger. Any reasonable officer would have known of this danger. No reasonable officer could have
believed such conduct was completely immune from liability.
The remaining issue is whether Smith's conduct actually violated Lewis's rights-whether Smith, by instituting and
conducting the high-speed pursuit in the manner in which he did was sufficiently reckless of Lewis's safety that
he can be held liable for Lewis's death. This is an issue that must be addressed by a finder of fact. Smith's actions,
as alleged by plaintiffs, could be deemed to be in reckless disregard of Lewis's life and personal security. There
exists a genuine issue of material fact. We thus reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Lewis on qualified immunity grounds.
D.
Plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Sacramento County and
the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department. Plaintiffs claim that both entities evidenced deliberate indifference
to Lewis's constitutional rights because they failed to adequately train Officer Smith in high-speed pursuits and
because the sheriffs department ignored its own pursuit policy. We conclude that the district court was correct in
granting summary judgment in favor of the county and the sheriffs department on this issue.
A municipality may be liable for actions resulting in violations of constitutional rights only when the conduct of
its official or agent is executed pursuant to a government policy or custom. To establish municipal liability under§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy;
(3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiffs constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving
force behind the constitutional violation. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the unconstitutional acts of a
government agent cannot, standing alone, lead to municipal liability; there is no respondeat superior liability under§ 1983. A municipality may only be liable where its policies are the " 'moving force [behind] the constitutional
violation.'"
Here, plaintiffs allege that the sheriffs department's and county's inadequate training of Smith caused the violation
of Lewis's constitutional rights. Smith had no official training in high-speed pursuits. He had, however, received
the sheriffs department's standard training in high-speed driving in 1976 and 1979. The district court found, as
a factual matter, that many of the driving skills overlap for high-speed driving and high-speed pursuits. Plaintiffs
do not contest this factual finding but argue that Smith should have received additional training.
The district court concluded that the training procedures implemented by the county and the sheriffs department
"are not so inherently inadequate as to subject the municipality to liability for a failure to train." What the district
court meant was that plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sheriffs
department's procedures were deliberately indifferent. We agree.
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that anyone other than Lewis had suffered a constitutional violation caused by a
Sacramento County Sheriffs Department high-speed pursuit. Moreover, "[tihat a particular officer may be
unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city." Inadequate training cases generally
involve a "program-wide inadequacy in training" rather than the training provided to a single government official.
Here, as in Alexander, plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence demonstrating "that the alleged inadequacy of [
] training was the result of a 'deliberate' or 'conscious' choice, which, under City of Canton, is necessary to establish
a municipal policy." Id. Absent such evidence, plaintiffs failed to raise a material issue regarding whether the
municipal defendants were deliberately indifferent. Rather, plaintiffs have raised only an issue of negligence,
which is not a sufficiently culpable standard of conduct to impose municipal liability.
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We also note that the facts, as alleged by plaintiffs, indicate that Officer Smith violated the sheriffs department's
pursuit policy. This violation further undermines any finding that the county or the sheriffs department, as opposed
to Smith, could be found to have been deliberately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of Lewis's safety.
Plaintiffs also argue that the municipal defendants have an unwritten policy of violating their own pursuit
guidelines. But the only evidence they have presented regarding this "policy" is that Officer Smith was not
disciplined by the sheriffs department for his pursuit of Lewis. This fact, standing alone, is insufficient to preclude
summary judgment on the issue of whether the municipal entities had a pursuit policy which was deliberately
indifferent to the constitutional rights of Lewis or any other person.
III.
Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Officer Smith acted with deliberate
indifference to or in reckless disregard of Lewis's right to life and personal security. Officer Smith is not entitled
to qualified immunity. We reverse and remand for trial on this issue; but we affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Sacramento County and the Sacramento County Sheriff s Department. AFFIRMED
in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. Each side to bear its own costs on appeal.
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96-792 KALINA V. FLETCHER
Ruling below (CA 9, 93 F.3d 653, 59 CrL 1513):
Prosecutor who allegedly made false statements in obtaining
arrest warrant was acting in "investigative" rather than
"advocatory" capacity and, therefore, is not entitled to absolute
immunity from civil rights suit filed pursuant to 42 USC 1983.
Question presented: Is prosecutor who has brought formal
criminal charges against defendant entitled to absolute immunity
from Section 1983 liability when, pursuant to state statute and
court rule, she causes arrest warrant to issue for purpose of
bringing defendants before court to respond to charges brought?
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HOW WRONG CAN A PROSECUTOR BE?
The Seattle Times
Monday, September 30, 1996
Lily Eng
IN A SEATTLE CASE, the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a ruling that prosecutors who make
false statements in seeking arrest warrants are not
entitled to total immunity from lawsuits. Prosecutors
say it will prevent them from doing their job.
The request for an arrest warrant in a burglary
case seemed quite ordinary among the hundreds King
County prosecutors filed in 1992. The stated facts were
simple:
Police investigators had found fingerprints at a crime
scene at Our Lady of Guadalupe School in West
Seattle, where someone had broken in and stolen
computer equipment.
In a sworn statement, a deputy prosecutor told a
judge that the fingerprints belonged to Rodney Fletcher
who, she said, was not associated with the school and
had no permission to be on the grounds.
She also wrote that Fletcher later tried to fence the
stolen computer to an electronics-store employee, and
that the employee identified him from a photo
montage.
Fletcher was arrested and jailed after the prosecutor
swore her statements were true.
They were not.
In fact, Fletcher, 36, had been hired to install glass
partitions in the school - which explains the
fingerprints. He had a solid alibi for the day of the
break-in.
And he had not been identified by any eyewitness.
The case against Fletcher was dropped and he later
sued the King County deputy prosecutor, Lynne
Kalina, in federal court, claiming she made false
statements against him with reckless disregard for the
truth, violating his constitutional rights.
In turn, Kalina asked a federal judge to throw the
case out before trial, saying prosecutors have absolute
immunity in such cases. The judge disagreed and sided
with Fletcher.
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals also sided with
Fletcher in a recent ruling, saying that prosecutors who
allegedly make false statements in seeking arrest
warrants are not entitled to absolute immunity.
Whether she should be entitled to a lesser form of
immunity should be determined at the trial, the court
said.
The ruling has sparked a vigorous debate in the
criminal-justice community, with defense attorneys
calling it only fair, and prosecutors saying it will
prevent them from doing their job and will make them
vulnerable to lawsuits.
The ruling also has focused attention on the
different roles prosecutors play and how some roles
remain entirely protected while others do not.
No comment
Why Kalina, who has worked for the King County
Prosecutor's Office since 1990, vouched for false
statements against Fletcher three years ago is unclear.
It's not known whether she confused one case with
another, relied too heavily on police reports, lied or
made an honest mistake.
Kalina, her attorneys and the police detective who
investigated the burglary all refuse to comment on the
case.
But in a letter from the prosecutor's office to
Fletcher after the case against him was dropped, Chief
Criminal Deputy Mark Larson wrote that it was
unfortunate that the case was ever filed.
"Frequently, we send cases back to law-enforcement
officers for more information/investigation. That
clearly would have been the better course of action in
this case," he wrote.
Prosecutors wear two hats
Key to the 9th Circuit's ruling is how the courts
view the different aspects of a prosecutor's job. In
essence, prosecutors can wear two hats: one as
investigators, the other as advocates for the state.
Prosecutors continue to receive absolute immunity
when they are acting as advocates - pursuing criminal
cases and presenting them during a trial. As
investigators, they receive less immunity, much like
police officers.
Fletcher's attorneys, in their court brief, argued that
absolute immunity for Kalina flew out the window
when, during the investigatory stage of the case, "she
personally vouched under oath for the 'facts' offered to
a judicial officer in support of the arrest-warrant
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application."
"When Ms. Kalina chose to take on the separate role
of a witness, she was acting not as a prosecuting
attorney but as a 'complainant' under Washington
law," they argued, and under such circumstances,
absolute immunity should not apply.
Police officers, for example, who obtain arrest
warrants under the same circumstances do not have
absolute immunity either.
King County senior prosecuting attorney John
Cobb, representing Kalina, disagreed, arguing that
Kalina was acting as a prosecutor in pursuing the
arrest warrant and therefore deserved absolute
immunity.
Cobb said he will appeal the ruling against Kalina
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Evolution of immunity
Immunity for prosecutors has evolved through the
years.
Seattle University law professor David Boerner,
himself a former King County prosecuting attorney,
said, "When I was a prosecutor we had total immunity,
and there was no distinction between being an
advocate and being an investigator."
Before the decision, added Seattle University law
professor John Strait, prosecutors faced only court
sanctions or disciplinary action from the Bar
Association if they were reckless with the information
they presented.
Now prosecutors fear that the courts might become
flooded with disgruntled defendants eager to have
another day in court.
"Prosecutors should be able to fearlessly prosecute
without the threat of retaliatory action or the concern
that defendants could come back and sue," Cobb said.
"It doesn't take much to file a lawsuit."
Indeed, the decision is viewed as a victory for
defendants.
Prosecutors "thought that they were insulated from
any liability and that they could be reckless and have
disregard for the truth," said Robert Mahler, who
represented Fletcher during the appeal.
But now, he said, "The opinion is, if prosecutors act
with reckless disregard, they can be sued."
Attorney Lori Gustavson, who discovered the
inaccuracies in Kalina's document, said the ruling
should ensure that prosecutors are careful and diligent
in doing their jobs.
"It doesn't seem to make sense to immunize the
prosecution if they have someone arrested improperly,"
she said.
Claim of innocence
When police first confronted Fletcher, a carpenter
with no criminal record, he insisted he was innocent,
that a mistake had been made.
Police told him they'd heard that line before. They
did, after all, have his prints on file - they'd questioned
him years earlier about a minor incident when he was
a teenager. Those prints matched the ones they found
at the school.
They put Fletcher in jail.
The mistake cost him several days' pay and
thousands in attorney fees.
"I had a routine, low-profile existence until this
happened," said Fletcher, who lives in Auburn with his
wife and two children.
A phone call by the prosecutor's office or the
police would have made it evident that Fletcher was
not their man, and would have spared him the
heartache and embarrassment of being arrested and
jailed, his attorneys said.
But Fletcher said no one contacted him or checked
out his alibi.
"A man who had done nothing got swept off the
street, thrown into jail and was subjected to police
treatment," said attorney Brady Johnson. "He had the
specter of criminal charges hanging over him. All of
these things happened because the prosecution was not
diligent and not careful."
Copyright 1997
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HIGH COURT TAKES PROSECUTOR-IMMUNITY CASE
The Seattle Times
Monday, February 24, 1997
Lily Eng
The United States Supreme Court today agreed to
decide whether a King County prosecutor has
immunity from a lawsuit filed against her by an
Auburn carpenter.
The court will determine whether deputy prosecutor
Lynne Kalina is entitled to full immunity from the
lawsuit filed by Rodney Fletcher, who was accused of
stealing computer equipment from a school in 1993.
The charges were filed but later dropped.
The case highlights a unique aspect of Washington
state's legal system in which prosecutors are allowed
to act as witnesses when seeking arrest warrants. In
the Fletcher case, Kalina had vouched for information
provided to a judge to support a warrant for Fletcher's
arrest. In other states, grand juries determine whether
there is cause for arrest.
After the case against Fletcher was dropped, he
sued Kalina in federal court, saying she had violated
his civil rights by filing statements she should have
known were false. Kalina then asked U.S. District
Judge Thomas Zilly to grant her full immunity as a
prosecutor and dismiss the lawsuit. Zilly refused and
said the issue of granting her qualified immunity
should be decided during a trial.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed,
saying prosecutors do not have absolute immunity
when preparing statements in support of an arrest
warrant. Kalina can still avoid liability by showing at
trial that her conduct did not violate a clearly
established constitutional right, the appeals court
ruled.
King County senior prosecuting attorney John
Cobb, who is representing Kalina, said today he is
confident the justices will rule in favor of the
prosecution.
"That's the right thing for them to do," Cobb said.
"The 9' Circuit and District Court were wrong."
Fletcher's attorney, Tim Ford, said the Supreme
Court has to decide whether the government can
develop practices that make it easier to arrest
somebody without going through safeguards.
"The question is whether we should make it
bureaucratically easy to arrest somebody and then
figure it all out later, or whether the government
should bear the risk of taking short cuts," Ford said.
In his suit, Fletcher said Kalina filed documents
saying he had no known association with the school
where the equipment was stolen, and did not have
permission to be in the school. The arrest warrant
also said someone identified Fletcher as the man who
tried to sell computer equipment from the school.
Fletcher said he had performed construction work
inside the school months before the burglary, and
therefore it was not surprising his fingerprint was
found inside. His suit also cited police reports that
said witnesses did not pick his photograph out of a
montage.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that prosecutors
have full immunity from lawsuits over their actions in
initiating and prosecuting a criminal case. But in
1991, the justices said prosecutors do not have full
immunity when they perform administrative or
investigative work.
In the appeal acted on today, Kalina's lawyers said
the document she filed was the equivalent of seeking
an indictment, and therefore she should be fully
immune.
But Fletcher's lawyers said Kalina was acting as a
witness in filing the statement and should not have
full immunity.
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Rodney FLETCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Lynne KALINA, Defendant-Appellant.
93 F.3d 653
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 7, 1996.
Decided Aug. 22, 1996.
EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
We must decide whether a state prosecutor who allegedly made false statements in an affidavit supporting an
application for a search warrant should be accorded absolute immunity. We hold that, based on Malley v. Briggs
and the functional analysis test, the prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity. We affirm and remand.
BACKGROUND:
In determining immunity, we must accept the plaintiffs allegations as true. Lynne Kalina, a deputy prosecutor,
was assigned to work on a case involving alleged theft of computer equipment from a private school in Seattle. She
prepared an application for an arrest warrant and an information charging Rodney Fletcher with second-degree
burglary. The warrant application was accompanied by a "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause," a
sworn declaration describing the results of the police investigation. Based on this document, which she signed, the
court issued an arrest warrant for Fletcher. The burglary charge was eventually dismissed when Fletcher's attorney
discovered inaccuracies in the certification.
Fletcher brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Kalina in federal district court alleging civil rights violations.
He contends that the certification contained information that Kalina knew or should have known was false. First,
it said that Fletcher "has never been associated with the school in any manner and did not have permission to enter
the school or to take any property." Fletcher alleged that he had been hired by the school to install the glass
partition on which his prints were found and that he had permission to enter the school. Second, the certification
said that an electronics store employee identified Fletcher as the man who attempted to sell him computer
equipment from the school. Fletcher contended that police reports indicated that no witness had identified him as
a suspect although two were shown photo montages.
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court denied Kalina absolute immunity and held that qualified
immunity was a question of fact to be determined at trial. This interlocutory appeal followed. We review de novo.
ANALYSIS:
Whether a state prosecutor is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for her actions in procuring an arrest
warrant is an issue of first impression in this circuit. In Imbler v. Pachtman the Supreme Court first considered
absolute immunity for prosecutors. The Court recognized that the prosecutor's job is both difficult and essential.
It noted that the "office of public prosecutor is one which must be administered with courage and independence.
Yet how can this be if the prosecutor is made subject to suit by those whom he accuses and fails to convict?" The
Court held that prosecutors were absolutely immune from prosecution for their actions during the initiation of a
criminal case and its presentation at trial. The Court described these functions as "intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process."
The Court later explicitly held that when prosecutors perform administrative or investigative, rather than
advocatory, functions they do not receive absolute immunity. To determine whether an action is
administrative/investigative or advocatory, we apply a "functional" analysis. We look at "the nature of the function
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." It follows that, "the actions of a prosecutor are not
absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor."
Since Imbler, the Court has addressed prosecutorial immunity in two cases. In Burns it held that a prosecutor is
absolutely immune for his conduct in presenting evidence at a probable-cause hearing for a search warrant, but is
not absolutely immune when giving legal advice to the police on whether they have probable cause to arrest. The
Court reasoned that appearing in court and presenting evidence were "clearly" advocatory. It did not believe,
however, that advising the police on whether they could hypnotize a witness and whether they had probable cause
to arrest was so closely associated with the judicial process that it required absolute immunity. The Court
emphasized that "[t]he presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect
government officials in the exercise of their duties."
In Buckley the Court held that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune when he allegedly fabricates evidence during
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the investigation by retaining a dubious expert witness. The Court reasoned that, because the prosecutor did not
yet have probable cause to arrest at the time he was shopping for an expert witness, the function was investigative,
not advocatory. The Court commented that:
There is a difference between the advocate's role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares
for trial, on the one hand, and the detective's role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give
him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand. When a prosecutor performs the
investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is "neither appropriate nor
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other."
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether a prosecutor is absolutely immune for conduct in obtaining a
search warrant. In Malley v. Briggs however, the Court held that a police officer who secures an arrest warrant
without probable cause cannot assert an absolute immunity defense.
The officer made two arguments, both rejected by the Court. He analogized himself to a complaining witness who
files a certification. The Court found this argument unavailing because complaining witnesses were not absolutely
immune at common law. The officer next argued that his action was similar to a prosecutor seeking an indictment,
a function that merits absolute immunity. The Court also rejected this argument, reasoning that the officer's actions
were "further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings...."
Relying on Malley and Buckley, we hold that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune when preparing a declaration
in support of an arrest warrant Kalina's actions in writing, signing and filing the declaration for an arrest warrant
are virtually identical to the police officer's actions in Malley.
Kalina argues that it is "standard practice" in King County for the prosecutor to prepare the certification, but the
local rules do not limit who may prepare it. If a police officer or complaining witness had filed the same
certification, she or he would not receive absolute immunity. To hold that Kalina is absolutely immune for
performing the same task would be inconsistent with the Court's functional analysis.
We note that the Sixth Circuit reached a different result when faced with a prosecutor's use of allegedly false,
coerced statements to obtain an arrest warrant. In Joseph v. Patterson the court held that the "decision to file a
criminal complaint and seek issuance of an arrest warrant are quasi-judicial duties involved in 'initiating a
prosecution,' which is protected under Imbler." In light of more recent Supreme Court law and the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Kohl, we decline to follow the Sixth Circuit. Joseph was issued before the Supreme Court decided
Buckley, which emphasized that it would be "incongruous" to expose police to potential liability while protecting
prosecutors for the same act. Moreover, although decided shortly after Malley, the opinion does not consider that
case in deciding whether seeking an arrest warrant merits absolute immunity.
Finally, Kalina argues that policy concerns dictate a finding of absolute immunity. Absolute immunity serves a
vital public interest by protecting prosecutors from distracting and time-consuming litigation. The Supreme Court,
however, has made it clear that qualified immunity is generally sufficient to protect against frivolous lawsuits. The
district court explicitly noted that qualified immunity was a question of fact in this case. We emphasize that Kalina
may be able to avoid liability by showing at trial that her conduct did not violate a clearly established right of which
a reasonable person would have known. The Supreme Court has noted that "[als the qualified immunity defense
has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law."
CONCLUSION:
Kalina is not absolutely immune for her actions in filing a declaration for an arrest warrant. We AFFIRM the
denial of summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.
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96-1569 BOGAN V. SCOTT-HARRIS
Ruling below (Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, CA 1, 1/15/97):
Mayor who recommended enactment of, and subsequently
approved, budget ordinance that eliminated city employee's job,
and city council member who voted for proposed ordinance, each
allegedly in response to employee's decision to fire subordinate for
racially offensive comments, do not enjoy legislative immunity from
employee's 42 USC 1983 claim alleging violation of First
Amendment.
Questions presented: (1) Did First Circuit err in affirming denial
of individual defendant's motions for judgement notwithstanding
verdict on grounds that, in conflict with this court and majority of
other circuit courts, it determined that absolute legislative
immunity was unavailable to municipal officials as defense to action
pursuant to 42 USC 1983, because of their improper motives and
even though municipal officials' challenged actions are
quintessentially legislative, i.e., enactment of local government
budget? (2) Did First Circuit err in holding that individual
municipal officials proximately caused plaintiff injury pursuant to
42 USC 1983, even though official municipal decision-maker acted
for lawful reasons to enact lawful municipal budgetary ordinance?(3) Are individual members of local legislative body entitled to
absolute immunity from liability under 42 USC 1983 for actions
taken in legislative capacity?
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COURT UPHOLDS RULING AGAINST 2 EX-OFFICIALS FOR FIRING
ADMINISTRATOR
The Providence Journal-Bulletin
Monday, January 20, 1997
Rob Corriea Journal-Bulletin Staff Writer
A U.S. Court of Appeals has upheld a lower court
verdict against two former city officials, saying they
conspired in 1991 to fire former city Administrator of
Health and Human Services Janet Scott-Harris, but in
the same ruling absolved the city of any wrongdoing.
The 40-page ruling written by Judge Bruce Selya
concluded that former Mayor Daniel Bogan and former
City Council Vice President Marilyn Roderick
conspired to eliminate Scott-Harris's job, under the
guise of budget cutting.
The court further ruled that Bogan and Roderick were
personally liable for damages totaling $231,000,
awarded in March 1994 by a U.S. District Court. The
award includes $156,000 in compensatory damages, as
well as $60,000 in punitive damages against Bogan
and$ 15,000 in punitive damages against Roderick.
The high court rejected the argument that their
positions with the city made them immune from
liability.
In May 1994, a jury found that the city, Bogan and
Roderick violated Scott-Harris's right to free speech. It
rejected an accompanying argument that the three
parties were guilty of racial discrimination. Scott-Harris
is black.
At issue was Scott-Harris's efforts to discipline a city
employee under her supervision for making racist
remarks.
During the trial it was noted that Scott-Harris was an
exemplary employee, but that she had a rocky
relationship with the city's political hierarchy. One
example cited in the court record was an incident in
1988, when Scott-Harris "stormed out of the room"
after she believed Roderick made inappropriate racial
comments about a job applicant during an interview.
"When Scott-Harris subsequently attempted to
apologize, Roderick hung up the telephone," Selya
noted in his opinion.
But the big falling out came over the comments of
Dorothy Biltcliffe, a nutrition program assistant for the
city's Council on Aging - comments that were cited
verbatim by Selya. Biltcliffe made comments offensive
to both blacks and French people, according to the
Selya's decision.
Following a disciplinary hearing March 27, 1991,
Biltcliffe agreed to accept a 60-day suspension without
pay. But by then, Scott-Harris's job had been eliminated
by the City Council, and she ended her employment
with the city two days after the hearing. Bogan
subsequently intervened and substantially reduced
Biltcliffe's punishment.
Scott-Harris's removal began a month earlier. In
February, Bogan asked the City Council to eliminate
Scott-Harris's position to save money, in the face of
declining state aid. On March 5, the ordinance
committee, chaired by Roderick, recommended passage
of the ordinance. It passed two weeks later and was
signed into law by Bogan.
Scott-Harris sued six months later, alleging her job
was dropped because she is black and a woman and
would not tolerate racism among city employees. Nearly
three years later, a jury rejected the racial argument, but
found her right to free speech had been violated.
Selya, in upholding the lower court ruling, said the
job-elimination ordinance was passed to punish
Scott-Harris for her protected speech.
Selya, however, found that the city was not liable
because it could not be assumed that the council
majority who voted for the ordinance acted in bad faith.
Selya said it was reasonable to believe that four
councilors who voted for it did so as a means of saving
the city money.
Selya noted that the lower court jury rejected the
argument that Roderick was motivated by cost-savings
measure. The jury found that the ordinance was "a
sham, and that Roderick knew as much," Selya wrote.
"We believe that the jury . . could reasonably have
concluded that Roderick's overall conduct was a
substantial factor in depriving the plaintiff of her
constitutional rights," he said.
The jury found much of the same evidence was
relevant to Bogan, and Selya concurred.
Selya said "the jury could have found that Biltcliffe
used political connections to hinder the investigation of
Scott-Harris's accusations by . . banishing the accuser,
and that Roderick and Bogan were the instruments of
her vengeance."
Biltcliffe is still employed by the city, working as
administrative assistant with the Council on Aging.
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LAWYER: OFFICIALS AREN'T IMMUNE
The Providence Journal-Bulletin
Thursday, June 12, 1997
ROBERT CORRIEA Journal-Bulletin Staff Writer
The lawyer representing Janet Scott-Harris, the
former city administrator of health and human
services, said yesterday that the two city officials
responsible for her firing in 1991 were not immune
from being sued, as their lawyer contends.
"Public officials in general don't have immunity. The
city clerk, the mayor, they don't have it," said Harvey
Schwartz, the Boston civil rights lawyer who
represents Scott-Harris. "Only members of a
legislative body have immunity for their legislative
actions."
Schwartz has twice won the argument over
legislative immunity, first in U.S. District Court in
1994, and again earlier this year, when most of the
lower court's ruling was upheld by the U.S. Court of
Appeals.
The case is expected to get a third airing late this
year before the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed
Monday to hear the case.
At issue is whether the two former city officials,
Mayor Daniel Bogan and Marilyn Roderick, vice
chairwoman of the City Council, can be held
personally liable for firing Scott-Harris.
A trial court three years ago found that the city,
Bogan and Roderick conspired to violate
Scott-Harris's right to free speech. The appeals court
later absolved the city of any wrongdoing, while
upholding damages totaling $231,000 against the two
officials.
The rulings were appealed to the Supreme Court in
April by lawyer Bruce Assad, who represents Bogan
and Roderick.
In his brief to the high court, Assad contended that
case law since the 1600s gives Bogan and Roderick
immunity from lawsuits. He said their actions
involving Scott-Harris were legal and done as part of
the legislative process.
Assad said Tuesday that if the high court does not
overturn the verdict, it will have a chilling effect on
anyone who may consider running for public office.
Schwartz said the question of immunity is not so
clear.
"What the law has said so far is, you look at the
nature of the action," Schwartz said. "If it's an
administrative action, like firing an employee, there
is no immunity. If it is a legislative action, there is
immunity. . . It gets real technical. It's not real
clear-cut."
Schwartz said that firing a municipal employee is an
administrative action, whether by the City Council or
mayor.
"The action was taken by the City Council, but the
law says you look at the nature of the action,"
Schwartz said. "The city cannot get immunity by
taking a day-to-day administrative action and running
it through the council for a vote."
Scott-Harris's job with the city was eliminated by the
City Council in March 1991, under the guise of
budget cutting. In her suit, she alleged that her job
was dropped because she is black and a woman and
would not tolerate racism among city employees.
Scott-Harris had previously clashed with Roderick,
and said she riled Bogan by disciplining Dorothy
Biltcliffe, a nutrition program assistant for the
Council on Aging and an ally of the mayor, for
comments Scott-Harris deemed offensive to blacks
and French people.
The courts found that Scott-Harris's job was
eliminated as punishment for speech that was
protected. Appeals Court Judge Bruce Selya cleared
the city, saying the councilors other than Roderick
who voted for the ordinance probably did so to save
the city money.
Schwartz said he has filed a separate brief with the
Supreme Court, asking the justices to reinstate the
lower court ruling that found the city also liable for
damages.
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Janet SCOTT-HARRIS, Plaintiff, Appellee,
V.
CITY OF FALL RIVER, et al., Defendants, Appellants.
Janet SCOTT-HARRIS, Plaintiff, Appellant,
V.
CITY OF FALL RIVER, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
1997 WL 9102
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard Nov. 6, 1996.
Decided Jan. 15, 1997.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
A TALE OF ONE CITY
The City hired the plaintiff, Janet Scott-Harris, as the administrator of the newly created Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS). When Scott-Harris entered the City's service in 1987, she became the
first African-American ever to hold a managerial position in the municipal government. By all accounts
she performed quite well at HHS. Withal, she did not enjoy a problem-free relationship with the City's
political hierarchs. In 1988, for example, she clashed with Marilyn Roderick, the vice-president of the City
Council. Scott- Harris believed that Roderick made inappropriate references to an aspirant's ethnicity in
the course of an employment interview and stormed out of the room. Shortly thereafter, she engaged in a
shouting match with Roderick. When Scott-Harris subsequently attempted to apologize, Roderick hung up
the telephone.
Scott-Harris' difficulties with Roderick did not end with the aforedescribed incident. There were periodic
flare-ups--by way of illustration, Roderick wrote a letter to the City Administrator, Robert Connors,
protesting Scott-Harris' use of a City-owned motor vehicle--but it was Scott-Harris' reaction to the
dysphemisms spouted by Dorothy (Dot) Biltcliffe, a nutrition program assistant for the City's Council on
Aging (COA), that precipitated internecine warfare. In the fall of 1990, Scott-Harris learned that Biltcliffe
had been making offensive comments. In one instance, referring to her co-worker Paula Gousie and to
Scott-Harris, Biltcliffe remarked: "That little French bitch has her head up that nigger's ass." In another,
Biltcliffe referred to a secretary as "a little black bitch." Scott-Harris spoke out against this racist invective
and, because COA operated under her general supervision, she consulted with Connors and then drew up
a set of charges against Biltcliffe as a prelude to dismissal.
The pendency of these charges did not improve Biltcliffe's manners; she called Scott-Harris "a black nigger
bitch" and warned that there would be repercussions because Biltcliffe "knew people." Biltcliffe
unabashedly pressed her case with two city councilors (Roderick and Raymond Mitchell) and a state senator
who, in turn, called Roderick. After numerous postponements the City held a hearing on March 27, 1991.
This resulted in a settlement under which Biltcliffe agreed to accept a 60-day suspension without pay.
Mayor Daniel Bogan subsequently intervened and pared the punishment substantially.
During this time frame the City's financial outlook worsened. Mayor Bogan directed Connors to prepare
a list of proposed budget cuts to accommodate the anticipated reduction in funding. Connors asked his
department heads, including Scott-Harris, for their input. Scott-Harris recommended reducing the hours
of school nurses. Bogan rejected this suggestion and, over Connors' objection, insisted that Scott- Harris'
position be eliminated.
In February 1991 Bogan asked the Council to do away with Scott-Harris' position. On March 5 the
ordinance committee, chaired by Roderick, reported out an emendatory ordinance designed to achieve this
end and recommended its passage. Three weeks later the City Council voted six-to-two (Roderick voting
with the majority) to approve the position- elimination ordinance. Bogan signed it into law.
THE LITIGATION
At trial the defendants asserted that their motives in passing the challenged ordinance were exclusively
fiscal. The plaintiff disagreed, contending that racial animus and a desire to punish her for protected
speech, not budgetary constraints, spurred the introduction and passage of the ordinance. On May 26,1994, evidently persuaded by the plaintiffs efforts to connect Dot to her dismissal, the jury returned a
verdict against all three defendants.
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INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
Legislative Immunity.
The individual defendants concentrate most of their fire on the district court's rendition of the doctrine of
legislative immunity. While municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit under section 1983, lawmakers
have absolute immunity from civil liability for damages arising out of their performance of legitimate
legislative activities. This immunity derives from federal common law and, under existing Supreme Court
precedents, embraces state lawmakers.
The Court has yet to decide whether local legislators are protected by this strain of absolute immunity, but
the lower federal courts, including this court, have shown no reticence in holding that the doctrine of
legislative immunity is available to such persons. We reaffirm today that the shield of legislative immunity
lies within reach of city officials.
This holding does not end our inquiry. Although legislative immunity is absolute within certain limits,
legislators are not immune with respect to all actions that they take. The dividing line is drawn along a
functional axis that distinguishes between legislative and administrative acts. The former are protected, the
latter are not. We have used a pair of tests for separating the two:
The first test focuses on the nature of the facts used to reach the given decision. If the underlying facts
on which the decision is based are "legislative facts," such as "generalizations concerning a policy or state
of affairs," then the decision is legislative. If the facts used in the decision making are more specific, such
as those that relate to particular individuals or situations, then the decision is administrative. The second
test focuses on "the particularity of the impact of the state of action." If the action involves establishment
of a general policy, it is legislative; if the action "single[s] out specifiable individuals and affect[s] them
differently from others," it is administrative.
When the relevant facts are uncontroverted and sufficiently developed, the question whether an act is
"administrative" as opposed to "legislative" is a question of law, and it may be decided by the judge on a
pretrial motion. When the material facts are genuinely disputed, however, the question is properly treated
as a question of fact, and its disposition must await the trial.
In some ways, Acevedo-Cordero and this case are fair congeners. There, as here, the defendants asserted
that budgetary woes sparked the enactment of a facially benign position-elimination ordinance. There, as
here, the plaintiff(s) countered with a charge that, in fact, a constitutionally proscribed reason lurked
beneath the surface. There, as here, conflicted evidence as to the defendants' true motives raised genuine
issues of material fact. Acevedo-Cordero teaches that in such situations the issue of immunity must be
reserved for the trial.
Judge Saris faithfully applied these teachings, refusing to reward premature attempts by the individual
defendants to dismiss the action on the basis of legislative immunity. At the end of the trial, the jury made
two crucial findings. First, it found that the defendants' stated reason for enacting the position-elimination
ordinance was not their real reason. Second, it found that the plaintiffs constitutionally sheltered speech
was a substantial or motivating factor in the actions which Roderick and Bogan took vis-a-vis the
ordinance. These findings reflect the jury's belief that the individual defendants relied on facts relating to
a particular individual-Scott-Harris- in the decisionmaking calculus and devised an ordinance that targeted
Scott- Harris and treated her differently from other managers employed by the City.
We think that in passing on the individual defendants' post-trial motions, the judge in effect accepted these
findings and concluded that the position- elimination ordinance (which, after all, constituted no more in this
case than the means employed by Scott-Harris' antagonists to fire her) constituted an administrative rather
than a legislative act. As long as the quantum of proof suffices--a matter to which we shall return--both
this conclusion and its natural corollary (that Roderick and Bogan are not shielded from liability by
operation of the doctrine of legislative immunity) rest on solid legal ground.
The judgment against the City of Fall River is reversed, and the fee award against it is vacated. The
judgments against the remaining defendants are affirmed and the case is remanded to the district court for
further proceedings in respect to both the previous fee award against these defendants and the question of
fees on appeal.
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96-1060 MILLER V. ALBRIGHT
Ruling below (CA DC, 96 F.3d 1467):
Equal Protection Clause is not violated by
U.S. laws that confer citizenship on every
legitimate child born abroad even when only
one parent is U.S. citizen, and on every
illegitimate child born abroad whose mother is
U.S. citizen even though father is alien, but
that require illegitimate child born abroad of
American father and alien mother to prove, in
order to acquire U.S. citizenship, both
biological relationship with father and personal
relationship with him, prior to child's 18th
birthday, as evidenced by father's written
agreement to provide financial support and
either father's voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity or court adjudication of paternity,
paternity decree requirement may not be
satisfied by decree issued after illegitimate
child of alien mother and American father has
reached age 18.
Questions presented: (1) Does distinction in
8 USC 1409 (a) between "legitimate" and
"illegitimate" children violate Equal Protection
Clause? (2) Does distinction in 8 USC 1409
(a) between "illegitimate" children of U.S.
citizen mothers and "illegitimate" children of
U.S. citizen fathers violate Equal Protection
Clause? (3) Is 8 USC 1409 unconstitutional
taking away of citizenship previously
conferred by 8 USC 1401(g)? (4) Is 8 USC
1409 unconstitutional under rational basis test?
(5) Does voluntary paternity decree that
legitimizes plaintiff effective as of date of her
birth, thus effectively legitimizing plaintiff
prior to her 18th birthday?
96-957 JEFFERSON V. TARRANT, ALA.
Ruling below (Ala SupCt, 7/12/96):
Alabama's wrongful death act, which permits
award of punitive damages only, is not
inconsistent with Constitution and law of
United States; wrongful death action for
compensatory damages, filed by decedent's
personal representative under 42 USC 1983,
alleging that, in accordance with municipal
policy of selectively denying fire protection to
minorities, firefighters purposefully refused to
attempt to rescue and revive decedent, is
governed by Alabama's wrongful death act,
not by federal common law.
Question presented: When decedent's death
is alleged to have resulted from deprivation of
federal rights occurring in Alabama, does
Alabama Wrongful Death Act, Section 6-5-
410 (Ala. 1975), govern recovery by
representative of decedent's estate under 42
USC 1983?
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